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BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST 
LAWMAKING: AUTHOR MEETS READERS, 
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, CHRISTINE 
HARRINGTON, SALLY ENGLE MERRY, 




ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER** is the Rose L. Hoffer 
Professor of Law and Chair of the Edward V. Sparer Public 
Interest Law Fellowship Program at Brooklyn Law School. She 
is the author of Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking (Yale 
University Press 2000), which won the 2000 Professional/ 
Scholarly Publishing Award of the Association of American 
Publishers, Legal Category. She is the coauthor of the law school 
                                                          
 * This article is a transcribed version of the Author Meets Readers panel 
discussion of Elizabeth M. Schneider’s book, Battered Women and Feminist 
Lawmaking, at the 2001 International Law and Society Conference in 
Budapest, Hungary on July 6, 2001. Both the readers who participated in the 
formal program and audience members who participated in the informal 
discussion and who were known to the panelists because of their work on 
issues of domestic violence are identified by name. Other audience members 
who participated in the informal discussion are not identified by name because 
they were not known to the panelists. 
 ** Thanks to Christine Harrington for chairing and organizing this panel, 
to Sally Merry, Renée Römkens, Mimi Wesson, Isabel Marcus, Elizabeth 
Rapaport and Betsy Stanko for participating in the program and for their 
generosity in helping to put the panel transcript together in publishable form. 
Special thanks go to Caroline Nadal, Audrey Woo, Angela Calcagno and the 
staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for their extraordinary commitment and 
superb work in putting this article together. 
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casebook, Battered Women and the Law (Foundation Press 2001) 
(with Clare Dalton), and has published many articles on gender, 
law, civil rights, and civil procedure. She has also been a 
Visiting Professor at Harvard and Columbia Law Schools. Before 
becoming a law teacher, she clerked for District Judge Constance 
Baker Motley in the Southern District of New York, and was a 
staff attorney at the Center for Constitutional Rights in NYC, and 
the Constitutional Litigation Clinic at Rutgers Law School-
Newark, where she litigated many landmark cases and did 
pioneering work on women’s rights. A graduate of Bryn Mawr 
College, she has an M.Sc. from The London School of 
Economics and a J.D. from New York University Law School. 
 
Chair of Panel 
 
CHRISTINE HARRINGTON is Associate Professor of Politics 
at New York University, and founding Director of the Institute 
for Law and Society and the Law and Society Program. Her 
research interests are in the areas of public law and law and 
society. She has published in Law & Society Review, Law & 
Policy and other journals on dispute processing (mediation and 
regulatory negotiation) and litigation (federal regulatory and 
federal appellate civil) as forms of political participation and sites 
of ideological production. Her book, Lawyers in a Postmodern 
World: Translation and Transgression (New York University 
Press 1994), examines the role of lawyers and professional power 
in American political development and state formation, as does 
Administrative Law and Politics (Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. 
2000). Professor Harrington is currently researching and writing 
about the cultural politics of rights as they materialize in global 
preservation movements, indigenous entitlement and reparation 





SALLY ENGLE MERRY is Professor of Anthropology at 
Wellesley College and Co-director of the Peace and Justice 
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Studies Program. Her work in the anthropology of law focuses 
on law and culture, law and colonialism, and the legal 
construction of race. She has written Colonizing Hawai’i: The 
Cultural Power of Law (Princeton University Press 2000), The 
Possibility of Popular Justice: A Case Study of American 
Community Mediation (co-edited with Neal Milner, University of 
Michigan Press 1993), Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal 
Consciousness Among Working Class Americans (University of 
Chicago Press 1990), and Urban Danger: Life in a Neighborhood 
of Strangers (Temple University Press 1981). She is currently 
studying the regulation of violence against women within the 
international human rights system, analyzing it as an example of 
an emergent global legal order. She is past-President of the Law 
and Society Association and the Association for Political and 
Legal Anthropology. 
 
RENÉE RÖMKENS is a criminologist who is Visiting Professor 
in the Institute for Research on Women and Gender at Columbia 
University and Associate Professor in the Department of General 
Social Sciences at Utrecht University in the Netherlands. She also 
holds a Ph.D. in Psychology from the University of Amsterdam. 
She has a long record of research in the field of domestic 
violence, including the first national survey in Western Europe 
(Netherlands), which she conducted in the late 1980s on 
prevalence, social risk markers and psychological consequences 
of violence against women. Her recent research in the United 
States is in the socio-legal domain and focuses on how the powers 
of law operate in a criminal justice system that increasingly 
cooperates with other disciplines. 
 
MARIANNE WESSON is Professor of Law, Wolf-Nichol 
Fellow, and President’s Teaching Scholar at University of 
Colorado. She has published articles about domestic violence, the 
pornography debate, and criminal law and procedure. In addition 
to her academic work, she provides regular legal commentary for 
National Public Radio’s Weekend Edition Sunday and has written 
two novels, Render Up the Body (Harper Mass Market 
Paperbacks 1998) and A Suggestion of Death (Pocket Books 
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2000). Professor Wesson received her J.D. from the University 
of Texas School of Law. She served as law clerk to Judge 
William Wayne Justice of the Eastern District of Texas as well as 
Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Colorado. 
AUDIENCE MEMBERS / DISCUSSION PARTICIPANTS 
ISABEL MARCUS is Director of the Institute for Research and 
Education on Women and Gender and Chair of Women’s Studies 
at the University of Buffalo, and Professor of Law at University 
of Buffalo School of Law. She holds a Ph.D. in political science 
and a J.D. from the University of California-Berkeley. Her 
writing has focused on women’s issues, most recently on 
domestic violence. She has traveled and lectured extensively in 
Eastern Europe, including Lithuania and Poland, as well as the 
People’s Republic of China, India, and Pakistan. In 1997, she 
was a Fulbright Lecturer on the Faculty of Law at Babes-Bolyai 
University, Cluj, Romania. She has written a book, Dollars for 
Reform: The OEO Neighborhood Health Centers (Lexington 
Books 1981), and is working on a second, Dark Numbers: The 
Emergence of Domestic Violence as a Law and Public Policy 
Issue in Eastern Europe and Russia. 
 
ELIZABETH RAPAPORT is the Dickason Professor of Law at 
University of New Mexico School of Law. She teaches criminal 
law, criminal procedure, and jurisprudence. Her scholarship 
reflects a longstanding interest in women in the criminal justice 
system and a more recent interest in executive clemency. She is 
currently at work on a book tentatively entitled Capital 
Punishment and the Domestic Discount: Gender, Family and the 
Death Penalty. Professor Rapaport received her J.D. from 
Harvard Law School and her Ph.D. from Case Western Reserve 
University. She taught philosophy at Boston University for ten 
years before attending law school. 
 
BETSY STANKO is Director of ESRC Violence Research 
Programme and Professor of Criminology in the Department of 
Social and Political Science, Royal Holloway, University of 
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London. She is the author of over sixty papers and books 
exploring gender and violence and decision-making of public 
officials. Most notable of these are Intimate Intrusions (Routledge 
1985) and Everyday Violence (Pandora Press 1990). She has 
studied police and policing since the mid 1970s. Her most recent 
research on domestic violence, an area in which she has been 
both an activist and a researcher for twenty-five years, includes 
Counting the Costs: Estimating the Impact of Domestic Violence 
in the London Borough of Hackney (1998) and Domestic Violence 
and Social Housing: Southwark (2000). Last autumn, she 
conducted the first day count on incidents of domestic violence 
known to police in the U.K. In January 2002, she joined the 
Office of Public Services Reform, Cabinet Office, as a Principal 
Advisor. She is also currently the project leader of Responding 
and Understanding Hate Crime, a study examining the use of 
routine information about the Hate Crime for the Metropolitan 
Police. Funded by the Home Office, this project is the first of its 





 We are here today to discuss Liz Schneider’s book Battered 
Women and Feminist Lawmaking1 and the issues this book raises 
                                                          
1 ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST 
LAWMAKING (Yale University Press 2000). The book examines the 
pathbreaking legal process that has brought the pervasiveness and severity of 
domestic violence to public attention and has led the United States Congress, 
the Supreme Court, and the United Nations to address the problem over the 
last thirty years. Schneider explores how claims of rights for battered women 
have emerged from feminist activism, and assesses the possibilities and 
limitations of feminist legal advocacy to improve battered women’s lives and 
transform law and culture. The book chronicles the struggle to incorporate 
feminist arguments into law, particularly in cases of battered women who kill 
their assailants and battered women who are mothers. With a broad 
perspective on feminist lawmaking as a vehicle of social change, Schneider 
examines a range of subjects including criminal prosecution of batterers, the 
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for law and society scholars.2 I will first sketch out two important 
themes in the book and then moderate the discussion among our 
panelists and with the audience. Our panelists are Professor Sally 
Merry, who teaches anthropology at Wellesley College, 
Professor Marianne (“Mimi”) Wesson, who is at the University 
of Colorado Law School, and Professor Renée Römkens, 
Visiting Professor at Columbia University and Professor at 
Utrecht University in the Netherlands. The author of the book is 
Professor Liz Schneider from Brooklyn Law School. Professor 
                                                          
civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, the O.J. 
Simpson trials, and a class on battered women and the law that she taught at 
Harvard Law School. Feminist lawmaking on woman abuse, Schneider 
argues, should reaffirm the historic vision of violence and gender equality that 
originally animated activist and legal work. 
 For reviews of Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking, see, e.g., 
Katherine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse: Battered Women and 
Feminist Lawmaking, 110 YALE L.J. 1459 (2001) (book review); Suzanne J. 
Groisser, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER 
& L. 385 (2001) (book review); Sally J. Scholz, Battered Women & Feminist 
Lawmaking, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 10 (2001) (book review); 
Marianne Wesson, 18 WOMEN’S REVIEW OF BOOKS 23 (2000) (book review); 
Liza Featherstone, Book World: Getting Even, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2000, at 
X10; Peter Glick, Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 
14, 2000, at 2; Julie Goldscheid & Mary McGowan Davis, Beyond 
Victimization: New Approaches to Gender Violence and Law Reform, Battered 
Women & Feminist Lawmaking, at http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/ 
revmar01.htm (book review); Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, Battered Women & 
Feminist Lawmaking, 11 LAW & POLITICS BOOK REV. 80, 80-82 (Feb. 2002), 
at http://www.polsci.wvu.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/schneider.htm (book  
review). See also Recent Publications, Battered Women and Feminist 
Lawmaking, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1829 (2001); Book Notes, 26 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 296, 296 (2001); Symposium, Confronting Domestic Violence and 
Achieving Gender Equality: Evaluating Battered Women and Feminist 
Lawmaking, AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. (forthcoming). 
2 Law and society scholars examine the function of law in society and the 
symbiosis between law and society. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and 
Society Movement, 38 STAN L. REV. 763, 775 (1986). The Law and Society 
Association was founded in 1964 and publishes the Law and Society Review. 
See The Law and Society Association, at http://www.lawandsociety.org. Its 
members are comprised of scholars in the areas of law, sociology, political 
science, anthropology, economics, and history. Id. 
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Schneider will have an opportunity to make some remarks about 
her book, then we will hear from each panelist. Finally, we will 
open the discussion up to the audience. 
It is hard to be systematic in my comments because I have 
been engaged with Liz’s argument about the dialectic between 
rights and politics from the time she first introduced dialectics as 
a feminist methodology and as a feminist epistemology for legal 
reform.3 This argument has made a profound feminist 
contribution to research areas in law and society, such as law and 
social policy, law and social change, and feminist legal theory. In 
the beginning of the book, Liz says, “I examine both the 
accomplishments and contradictions through the lens of feminist 
legal advocacy efforts on violence against women in the United 
States.”4 Her theoretical approach is not concerned with 
measuring the successes or failures of the movement. She does 
something more methodologically sophisticated than “gap 
studies,” which repeatedly (and inevitably) find that there is a 
“gap” between reform ideas and implementation of policy.5 The 
book examines the interrelationship between law and social 
movement practices in order to understand a larger problem for 
law and social policy—the interrelationship between rights and 
politics viewed in terms of the dialectic between consciousness 
and social change. In the case of the U.S. movement against 
domestic violence, Liz employs dialectics to deconstruct familiar 
categories in law and in society (e.g., public/private; 
male/female; civil/criminal; mother/child; husband/wife; etc.). 
She argues that these binary categories are themselves the focus 
of consciousness raising in the feminist movement and in feminist 
lawyering. In so doing, the book systematically unravels the 
complexity of lawmaking for feminist lawyers. She writes, 
“lawmaking and rights assertions can be understood as forms of 
                                                          
3 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: 
Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986). 
4 SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 5. 
5 See CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (Greenwood Publ’g 
Group 1985) (examining the legal formalism that results in a gap between 
socio-legal reform ideology and institutional practice). 
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the philosophical concept of praxis.”6 If consciousness-raising is 
itself a form of praxis, then the work of transcending gendered 
social and legal dichotomies, such as those to which I just 
referred, may in turn explain how new and perhaps even more 
emancipatory social practices for women are forged in intimate, 
as well as state relationships. While her analysis gives particular 
weight to “historical contingency” as a key factor in shaping the 
politics of rights, the dialectical method she employs makes a 
compelling argument that “rights” and “politics” are best 
understood as praxis. 
The book examines over thirty years of work on social 
constructions of “violence against women”—social constructions 
produced by the state, by feminist scholars, by lawyers, by 
battered women and children, by the courts and by other social 
forces like economics, psychology, politics, etc.7 The book 
synthesizes disparate bodies of research from an array of 
disciplines on how and why particular social constructions of 
domestic violence dominate at particular periods in U.S. history. 
This aspect of the book makes another important contribution to 
law and society work. For here, in the deconstruction of 
gendered battery, Liz carves out new social space, new social 
understanding of law, for the survivors of domestic violence. I 
am referring to the survivors who did not have advocates, the 
survivors who did not have feminist lawyers, the survivors 
Professor Linda Gordon writes about in Heroes of Their Own 
Lives.8 The interdisciplinary approach Liz develops makes better 
                                                          
6 SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 34 (citing Karl E. Klare, Lawmaking As 
Praxis, 40 TELOS 123, 132 n.28 (1979)); Schneider, supra note 3, at 600 
(explaining that “[t]he fundamental aspect of praxis is the active role of 
consciousness and subjectivity in shaping theory and practice, and the dynamic 
interrelationship that results . . . . [L]awmaking can be a form of praxis; it can 
be constitutive, creative, and an expression of the ‘embeddedness of action-in-
belief and belief-in-action.’”) (quoting Klare, supra at 132 n.28). 
7 SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 13-28; see also infra note 25 (regarding 
the ever-expanding and unstable definition of violence against women). 
8 LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND 
HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 250-88 (Viking Penguin 1988) (delineating the 
gender-based causes of spouse abuse, describing difficulties of mothers in 
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sense of law and social policy for those of us who have survived 
domestic violence in the pre-1970s period—for those of us who 
have our stories recorded in police records as “family 
disturbances” or “family quarrels.” The approach provides a way 
to understand more fully how these social constructions operated 
in law and society and in women’s lives.9 While the book may 
make sense for/to survivors of domestic violence, it does not 
portray them as heroic or super human. To do so would embrace 
an individualist explanation of domestic violence and lend 
support to volitional policies. Instead, Liz’s analysis suggests that 
the survivors are representative of a human condition that moves 
them and us to struggle for emancipation. That condition, that 
vision of emancipation, is made present in how Liz writes about 
the detailed practices of feminist lawyering in which she is 
implicated. 
With these two contributions in mind, one more classically 
academic—her analysis of the dialectic of rights and politics— 
and the other more general—her view of what motivates social 




Let me provide some background. The book comes out of 
thirty years of my work in a variety of different contexts: as a 
lawyer, as an activist, as a theorist, and as a law teacher. In the 
book I offer a critical perspective on the last thirty years of 
feminist legal advocacy, in which I have been involved both as a 
lawyer and as a theorist. The link between theory and practice 
has been something that has been very much a part of my life and 
my own work, my approach to law, my teaching. The book not 
                                                          
procuring relief from abuse, and examining the pattern of battered women’s 
resistance from 1880 to 1960). 
9 Id. at 278, 285-86, 294 (showing that wife beating has been sanctioned 
and controlled throughout history by cultural influences such as religion, law, 
family and friends, evidenced by a history of female subordination and 
passivity, the reluctance of the state through legal means to interfere with 
family privacy, and the protection sought in the refuge of supportive family 
members’ homes). 
SCHNEIDERMACRO 7-11FINALWINTRO.DOC 7/24/02  1:18 PM 
322 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
only talks about activism and experience in a number of different 
areas of lawmaking, but it talks about the process of change. For 
example, in addition to problems of litigation and lawyering, I 
discuss the importance of bringing some of these insights and 
perspectives around domestic violence into law schools and other 
academic fields, and the difficulty in teaching issues of domestic 
violence.10 
The book is intended to be a kind of insider self-critical 
reflection—critical in raising hard questions for those of us who 
have been involved in this work, struggling with these questions 
more broadly. Since I know there are many of you in the room 
who have not read the book, the most important theme is that 
while domestic violence has been recognized as a more serious 
public problem, public thinking and legal work around domestic 
violence have become decontextualized from issues of gender. 
The notion of gender is what originally shaped activism and law 
reform on domestic violence—it is the way in which activists 
framed it. Domestic violence was a moment, a part of a broader 
problem of gender inequality. But now domestic violence has 
become unmoored from those issues of gender, for a whole 
variety of reasons, which I develop in the book.11 The book 
argues that it is necessary to reaffirm the original impetus of 
activism and advocacy on domestic violence, the inextricable link 
                                                          
10 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 105-11, 211-12, 223-27. 
11 See id. at 6, 21-28, 96-97, 101-11, 182-88, 228-32. Traditionally, 
feminists have argued that systemic societal female subordination produces 
gender violence. Id. at 5, 22-23, 228. Feminists who began the battered 
women’s movement, many of whom were themselves battered, viewed 
battered women as sisters in the larger struggle towards gender equality. Id. at 
22-23, 96. They worked not only to alleviate the threat of violence, but also to 
address social and economic disparities that subordinate women and make 
them susceptible to gender-motivated violence. Id. at 22-23, 96. As the 
movement has gained legitimacy, Schneider argues that the link between 
battering and gender bias has become increasingly subverted and that 
lawmakers approach violence against women as if it can be solved in isolation 
from its historical and social contexts. Id. at 6, 27-28. Broader issues of 
gender such as socialization, lack of education, child care, employment 
discrimination, and poverty are frequently excluded from consideration in 
legal reform concerning domestic violence. Id. at 23-26, 183, 229-30. 
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I was delighted to have a chance to read and comment on this 
book. Liz Schneider has provided us an invaluable overview of 
the key elements of feminist legal thinking about battered 
women. The book is well-grounded in past struggles,12 so there is 
a clear sense of development and change in the field. It is also 
rooted in feminist analysis,13 resisting the increasingly pervasive 
psychological and family systems models, which are coming to 
                                                          
12 SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 15-23, 39, 42-45, 88-97. Schneider notes 
that domestic violence has been part of practically every culture throughout 
history. Id. at 13. For example, Anglo-American common law and early 
Roman law provided that a husband could treat his wife as property, and it 
was his prerogative to chastise her. Id. at 13. 
 An initial wave of advocacy in the United States during the nineteenth 
century achieved measured success by focusing primarily on domestic violence 
instead of attacking male dominance generally or asserting the woman’s 
inherent right to freedom and equality. Id. at 16, 18, 43. However, 
achievements did not translate into real progress, as the movement’s initial 
success in prohibiting public violence against women could not protect 
violence against women in the marital context, which courts felt was beyond 
their capacity to adjudicate. Id. at 17-18, 88-97. For example, family court 
judges often failed to provide a battered woman with physical protection if she 
filed a complaint against her batterer, asserting that family preservation was 
necessary and the abuse could be cured or corrected. Id. at 18. 
 The second wave of advocacy during the twentieth century was premised 
on the notion of a woman’s inherent right to be free from violence and led to 
the development of social services and increased social and economic 
opportunities for women. Id. at 21-22, 39, 42-43. Domestic violence survivors 
still struggle within a social framework of gender inequality, leading to their 
economic dependence on the batterer, the absence of social support networks 
to aid in mothering, lack of educational opportunities, lack of child care and, 
in general, their social and economic vulnerability. Id. at 12-13, 23. 
13 Schneider’s feminist analysis encompasses not only gender-based 
descriptions explicitly linking gender, violence and women’s equality, but also 
broad descriptions of battering that explore interrelationships between 
coercion, power and control, and political descriptions of battering using 
statist imagery (such as terrorism and torture) to detail the experience of 
battering. Id. at 46-49. 
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dominate this field. One of its values is its commitment to this 
feminist approach, an approach to a large extent on the defensive 
in the U.S. today. I also appreciated the book because it is 
grounded in legal questions. What are the evidentiary difficulties 
of these cases? What are the preconceptions of judges? What are 
the biases in the way the categories of law privilege men’s 
experiences? There is clearly a sense of looking back in this 
book, of assessing the past thirty years of this movement and 
confronting some of its ironies and the areas of resistance it has 
encountered. 
Schneider recognizes that despite major advances in the 
battered women’s movement,14 there is still a great deal of 
resistance and some indication that resistance is increasing. The 
story is one of good intentions and good interventions poorly 
carried out by police, judges and legal officials who are often too 
ambivalent about prosecuting men who are violent with their 
partners. The public/private divide that relegated this problem to 
the bedroom rather than the courtroom seems to have remained 
intractable, relatively unchanged despite enormous pressure to 
change.15 
I found the situation of the defense of women who kill their 
batterers among the most important ironies in the book. It seems 
to me that this problem more than any other engaged feminist 
legal scholars in the early part of the movement. But this problem 
led to a very productive reexamination of the concept of self-
defense, the way it was applied to women rather than men, and 
                                                          
14 Schneider argues that the development of a battered women’s 
movement has advanced and improved women’s self-determination, self-
organization, and democratic participation as citizens. Id. at 20-27. 
15 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (exemplifying 
judicial reluctance to encroach on the marital bedroom); Soto v. Flores, 103 
F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 819 (1997) (affirming the 
dismissal of an abused woman’s § 1983 suit against local police, who refused 
to arrest her abusive husband days before he killed himself and her children, 
and holding that the woman had not been deprived of her constitutional right 
to due process and that no constitutional duty exists for police to protect 
citizens from private violence). See generally Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of 
Love”: Wife Beating As Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996). 
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the nature of male identity presumed by reasonable man 
concepts.16 The irony lies in the development of the explanatory 
framework of “battered women syndrome.” As Schneider shows 
well, this particular framework has reinforced images of battered 
women as passive, helpless victims.17 I think it was so successful 
precisely because it was so compatible with existing gender 
ideologies. Much as the right to abortion founded on privacy 
arguments has served to reinforce the domain of the family as 
private,18 this argument reinforced images of women’s passivity, 
even as it may have succeeded in freeing the women who killed 
their batterers. 
Schneider also asks about the implications of using a rights 
approach for this problem.19 This is a key question, both for the 
United States movement, which began with some ambivalence 
about rights, and for the international violence against women 
movement. As she points out, early activists recognized the 
problem of using rights, but they had to rely on the law as a way 
to define the problem and intervene in it.20 As the global 
                                                          
16 Gender bias has long plagued the application of self-defense laws to 
battered women who kill; judges and attorneys tended to categorize these 
women as “mentally ill” or “temporarily insane” rather than to view their 
actions as taken in self defense and to apply a reasonableness standard. See 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 79-83, 113-15, 121-22. The traditional doctrine 
of self-defense was based on the experience of men and did not account for 
women’s different perceptions. Feminist legal scholars have attempted to 
introduce evidence to help juries understand that women who kill their 
batterers may act in reasonable and justifiable self-defense. Id. at 121-26. 
17 Id. at 62. Schneider argues further that defining battered women as 
helpless victims is also dangerous because it revives the concept of excuse by 
“focus[ing] on the woman’s defects, the woman as subject to the ‘syndrome,’” 
thus implying the woman is “inherently deficient instead of affirming the 
circumstances of her act.” Id. at 135. The term “battered woman syndrome” 
triggers stereotypes for lawyers and judges and plays into the patriarchal 
attitudes of courts. Id. at 137. Consequently, the term “battered woman 
survivor” has begun to be used instead of “victim.” Id. at 76. 
18 See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
19 SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 34-45 (discussing the development and 
shortcomings of the rights approach to feminist lawmaking). 
20 Id. at 38-45. 
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movement expands in the wake of the Vienna Conference of 
199321 and the Beijing Conference of 1995,22 a rights approach is 
                                                          
21 The World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, Austria, 1993, 
addressed a broad spectrum of human rights activities and specifically 
addressed women’s human rights issues. Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, World Conference on Human Rights (June 
1993), at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/wchr.htm. The Vienna Dec-
laration and Programme of Action provided in part that the equal participation 
of women in all aspects of life and the elimination of sexual discrimination 
were priorities of the international community. Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, U.N. Commission on Women, 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.6/1995/5/Add.7 (1995), available at http://www.un.org/esa/gopher-
data/esc/cn6/1995/1995-5.en7. The declaration specifically called for the 
appointment of a Special Rapporteur on violence against women and for the 
drafting of a declaration eliminating violence against women. Hanna Roberts, 
The Human Rights of Women in the United Nations: Developments 1993-1994, 
available at http://www.amnesty.se/women/23ae.htm. In late 1993, the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence Against Women, which defines violence against women broadly to 
include physical, sexual, and psychological harm and calls for member states 
to eliminate violence against women through preventive, investigative, and 
punishing measures. Id. In 1994, the United Nations appointed the first 
Special Rapporteur, Radhika Coomaraswamy, who collects information 
relating to violence against women, recommends remedial measures, and 
works with other critical members of the Commission on Human Rights. See 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 53; United Nations Department of Public 
Information, Women and Violence (1996), at http://www.un.org.rights/dpi 
1772e.htm. 
22 The United Nations held its Fourth World Conference on Women in 
Beijing in September 1995, during which officials drafted the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action. The declaration acknowledged the 
advancement of the status of women, but, noting persisting gender 
inequalities, called for governments worldwide to take positive steps to ensure 
peace for the advancement of women, to promote women’s economic 
independence, and to eliminate all forms of discrimination. “Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women” 
U.N. Doc A/Conf. 177/20 (1995). For more detailed discussion, see Elizabeth 
L. Larson, United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for 
Equality, Development, and Peace (Beijing, China: September 1995), 10 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 695 (1996); Margaret Plattner, The Status of Women 
Under International Human Rights Law and the 1995 UN World Conference 
on Women, Beijing, China, 84 KY. L.J. 1249 (1996). One hundred eighty-
nine governments adopted the Platform for Action, including the United 
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becoming increasingly central. Yet, it is contested in many of the 
same ways that rights are ambivalent and contested in the U.S. A 
fundamental theme that arises throughout this book is the 
discussion about individual or collective rights, how these rights 
are to be defined, and whether rights can be maintained in a more 
collective sense.23 
I want to emphasize three major points from the book that I 
found valuable, although there were many others. The first is the 
difficulty of defining the problem itself. There are so many 
labels, with so many different implications. The term “battered 
woman” itself is one among many, and Liz talks about which 
term to use.24 Does this mean woman as victim? Does this ignore 
attention to the perpetrator? What is the meaning of gender-
neutral terms like “spouse assault”? I think defining the problem 
is critical because the solution depends on how the problem is 
defined. If the problem is defined as “patriarchy,” there is one 
set of solutions; if defined as “spouse assault,” solutions depend 
on family functioning. I think that this book, which begins by 
foregrounding that problem, is very important. Much of the 
struggle in the movement has actually been to create a stable 
definition.25 I think a definition is elusive because so much is at 
                                                          
States, and United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan reported that 
women’s lives had improved as a result. See Press Release, United Nations, 
Secretary-General in Address to Women’s International Forum Says Shaping 
UN’s Future in New Century “Vital Exercise” (Jan. 14, 2000). In June 2000, 
the United Nations held a Special Session to reaffirm member states’ 1995 
commitments and held panel discussions examining the role of men and boys 
in ending gender-based violence, on promoting dialogue between government 
and non-government organizations, and on mainstreaming gender perspectives 
in peacekeeping operations. See Special Session of the General Assembly, 
Beijing + 5, Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the 
Twenty-First Century (2000), at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ 
followup/beijing+5.htm. 
23 SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 62-65, 103. 
24 SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 45, 60-62. 
25 There has been wide variety in the definition of “domestic violence.” 
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (West 1994) (defining domestic violence as 
abuse of a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, dating 
partner, fiancée, person with whom the abuser has a child, child of the abuser, 
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stake—whether this is a movement against institutions that 
reinforce male power and the family, or whether this is a 
movement about psychologically dysfunctional men or women. 
The continuing definitional instability is symptomatic of the 
importance of the problem. And because the definition of a 
problem inexorably points to the solution and the particular mode 
of intervention, the difficulty of defining the problem leads to 
complexity in the kinds of responses and solutions that we are 
seeing on the ground, which vary between psychotherapeutic 
approaches to much more culturally transformative ones that may 
begin to address problems of patriarchy. Batterer intervention 
programs for men provide an interesting example. Here we see 
the tension between the individual and the collective 
understanding of rights. Is battering defined as an individual 
violation of rights or as a violation of a collective body of 
individuals such as women, whose rights are being systematically 
denied? 
This problem appears in the human rights international level 
as well. One of the interesting issues on the international level is 
the wide variation in the definition of the problem in different 
national and sub-group contexts. This is related to differences in 
the way the problem is conceptualized based on different kinship 
                                                          
or other person related by consanguinity or affinity); John M. Burman, 
Lawyers and Domestic Violence: Part I, 24 WYO. LAWYER 36, 38 (2001) 
(defining domestic violence as “a pattern of coercive behavior . . . perpetrated 
by who was or is in an intimate relationship with the victim”); see also Health 
Resource Center on Domestic Violence/Family Violence Prevention Fund, 
Health Care Responses to Domestic Violence Fact Sheet, available at 
http://endabuse.org/programs/display.php3?DocID=25 (describing domestic 
violence as a pattern of coercive and assaultive behaviors, such as physical, 
psychological or sexual attacks, or economic coercion used by individuals 
against their partners); National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, What is 
Battering?, available at http://ncadv.org/problem/what.htm (asserting that 
battering is a pattern of behavior employed to exert power and control over 
another individual via fear and intimidation); New York State Office for the 
Prevention of Domestic Violence, A Power and Control Perspective, available 
at http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/about_dv/wheeltext.html (explaining how 
domestic violence entails a range of behaviors with maintenance of power and 
control as the goal). 
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systems and different ideologies about how societies are 
organized. For example, I just spent a little time in China 
interviewing practitioners and scholars working on the problem 
of violence against women. Although the Chinese take inspiration 
from Seoul,26 Beijing27 and the U.S. movement,28 the concern, at 
least in some of the literature I read, is that the problem needs to 
be defined differently in the context of the Chinese kinship 
system.29 One argument is that the U.S. model, which is also the 
European model, tends to focus on sexual relationships across a 
                                                          
26 South Korea has addressed problems of domestic violence through 
family law reform. The government first recognized decades of work by 
women’s rights advocates by enacting major family law revisions in January 
1991, which somewhat improved women’s rights in the areas of marriage, 
divorce, child custody, and property inheritance. See Rosa Kim, The Legacy 
of Institutionalized Gender Inequality in South Korea: The Family Law, 14 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 145, 149-53 (1994). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 1999 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES—DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA (Feb. 25, 2000), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/southkor.html; Erin Cho, Caught 
in Confucius’ Shadow: The Struggle for Women’s Legal Equality in South 
Korea, 12 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 125 (1998) (tracing the evolution of Korea’s 
family law revision movement). 
27 See supra note 22 (describing the 1995 Beijing Conference). 
28 The United States addresses problems of domestic violence using a 
legal rights and legislative approach. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 34-54; 
compare the battered women’s movement in Great Britain, infra notes 71-72 
and accompanying text. See also infra note 64 (describing the Violence 
Against Women Act). 
29 The Chinese kinship system is centered on the Confucian belief that 
emphasizes the importance of a societal “moral order expressed through the 
five cardinal relationships.” William P. Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental? 
Implications of Roberto Unger’s Uses and Abuses of the Chinese Past, 64 
TEX. L. REV. 915, 941 (1986). These five cardinal relationships are “those 
between ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder and 
younger brother, and older and younger friend,” Id. at n.205. Many Chinese 
traditions, including certain aspects of its legal system, are rooted in the 
traditional Chinese kinship system. Janice A. Lee, Note, Family Law of the 
Two Chinas: A Comparative Look at the Rights of Married Women in the 
People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 217, 219 (1997). 
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wide variety of settings—relationships such as 
boyfriend/girlfriend, husband/wife, same-sex partners, and 
various romantic relationships—whereas in China, the grounding 
is in the kinship system, but the victim can be the wife, the infant 
girl, or the old father or mother.30 There is a different array and 
structure of kin that can be part of these battered relationships, 
given the nature of the patrilineal, patrilocal family structure. 
This kind of instability at the heart of the problem is an 
interesting issue to consider as the definition of the problem 
crosses national boundaries. 
The second point in the book that I thought was very 
instructive and interesting is the difficulty of lawyering in this 
field—the really painful dilemmas and dichotomies for feminist 
lawyers trying to use the courts. Especially trenchant is the 
analysis of the struggle to move past the dichotomy between 
victims and agents. Again, the explanatory framework of 
“battered women’s syndrome” exacerbated this problem by 
creating women as deserving protection only if they are defined 
as victims. This dichotomy exists despite efforts to redefine 
women as survivors, which I have found in my own research is 
clearly the preferred term.31 
I was thinking about this in light of David Garland’s recent 
book called The Culture of Control32 in which he talks about the 
shift in criminal justice theory that took place in the 1970s in the 
United States from a focus on protecting the defendant and the 
defendant’s rights to a focus on defending the victim and 
prosecuting the perpetrator. This shift has led to longer and 
                                                          
30 See Yuhong Zhao, Domestic Violence in China: In Search of Legal and 
Social Responses, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 211, 218-19 (2001) (advocating 
a broader definition for the term “domestic violence” in China to include other 
family members such as children and grandchildren). See generally Paula C. 
Littlewood, Domestic Child Abuse Under the U.N. Convention on the Rights 
of the Child: Implications for Children’s Rights in Four Asian Countries, 6 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 411, 426-431 (commenting on the state of child abuse 
in China). 
31 See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 61, 76. 
32 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL 
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (Univ. of Chi. Press 2001). 
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longer periods of incarceration, more severe punishments, and 
more punitive attitudes towards defendants; yet the transition was 
partly engineered by a focus on the victim, who became much 
more central to our theorizing in the late twentieth century than 
he or she had been before. Ironically, the success of the feminist 
movement in foregrounding the victim has, in fact, contributed in 
some ways to this more punitive, less rehabilitative approach 
towards offenders of all sorts, not just batterers. I think this is 
one of the painful dilemmas of trying to do lawmaking in this 
domain. Indeed, as Schneider points out, it is only as victims that 
women get help in court, and even within that framework, their 
inability to be heard is severely circumscribed.33 At the same 
time, by emphasizing the image of this vulnerable, undeserving 
victim, the battered women’s movement itself may have 
contributed to the refocus of the criminal justice system.34 This is 
clearly one of those ironies of social transformation. 
A second unintended and undesired consequence of the 
criminalization of battering has been the continued legal 
surveillance and incarceration of men of color. In my research, it 
turned out that the vast disproportion of men who end up in 
batterer’s treatment programs are poor and men of color.35 These 
are not, of course, the only men who batter, but they are the ones 
who end up in the criminal justice system. And, as Angela Davis 
asked at the first Color of Violence Conference last year, is the 
                                                          
33 SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 186 (explaining arguments that mandatory 
prosecution and no-drop policies can “re-victimize women by subjecting them 
to further coercion at the hands of the state; they increase the risk of 
retaliation against the victim by the batterer; and finally, they disempower 
women by taking their autonomy away from them”). 
34 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 74-86 (regarding the issues relevant to 
victimization of women in feminist lawmaking and arguing that gender 
subordination should be understood as a process in which women can both be 
oppressed and offer resistance simultaneously). See also id. at 186 (regarding 
arguments of those who believe that “shifting the decision to prosecute from 
the victim to the state disempowers batterers and prevents them from further 
manipulating justice and endangering victims’ lives”). 
35 Sally Engle Merry, Gender Violence and Legally Engendered Selves, 2 
IDENTITIES: GLOBAL STUDIES IN CULTURE AND POWER 49 (1995). 
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criminal justice system the only way to go?36 Did white feminists 
who pursued this route really think about the dilemmas for 
women of color, whose partners have already been 
disproportionally subject to police and judicial surveillance? 
Schneider notes that this was early recognized as a problem in the 
feminist movement,37 and yet, it is one of those painful dilemmas 
that is hard to escape. In my more cynical moments, I wonder if 
the success of the battered women’s movement in bringing these 
cases to court and achieving at least minimal standards for arrest, 
prosecution, and even occasional incarceration is in part because 
it dovetailed with these other agendas, both the refocus on 
victims and the increase of control and surveillance over men of 
color. I am not making any claims about intentionality. I am only 
saying that this convergence of conservative and feminist 
interests may have facilitated feminist successes, although not in 
a way advocated or desired by feminists. 
Although the whole book is very strong, one of the strongest 
chapters discusses the dilemmas of motherhood and battering.38 It 
has long been clear to me that there is an image of a good victim 
as one who calls the police, who prosecutes the case, who 
testifies, and who leaves. But it seems clear that there is also an 
image of a good mother, and this is a similarly constrained 
identity. Only if one behaves a certain way does one really merit 
the support of the criminal justice system. The good mother is the 
person who immediately leaves the partner, protects her children 
at all costs, puts the interests of her children before her own, and 
is the person who deserves help, not the others.39 It is a very 
constraining identity. I thought that this analysis was really 
fascinating and full of painful dilemmas for lawyering in this 
sphere of work. 
                                                          
36 Angela Davis, Keynote Address at The Color of Violence: Violence 
Against Women of Color (Oct. 25, 2000), in 3 COLORLINES, Fall 2000, 
available at http://csf.colorado.edu/soc/m-fem/2000/msg01004.htm. 
37 SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 63-64, 184, 196. 
38 Id. at 148-78. 
39 See, e.g., id.; LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES 252-64 
(Viking 1988) (describing certain traits of mothers that are detrimental to 
receiving social agency relief). 
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The third point I wanted to discuss is the implication of the 
growing international human rights movement against violence 
against women. I agree with Liz that the international movement 
has very significantly re-politicized the problem, taken it back out 
of the domain of psychological definitions of individual 
malfunction—the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) 
discussions—and moved it to a new, more political domain.40 
Schneider makes this point clear, and I think it is a critical one. It 
is interesting that in the international debates, the definition of 
violence against women has become increasingly expansive. It 
now includes trafficking, rape in wartime, violence against 
women in refugee camps, the effects of poverty, armed conflict, 
globalization, and structural adjustment programs.41 
People talked about this very issue at the Beijing Plus Five 
Conference42 and have talked about it at other international 
meetings. I heard one woman from Nigeria ask at Beijing Plus 
Five, “Can you consider polygamy violence against women?” 
This was in a non-government organization (“NGO”) discussion 
about violence against women. The organizer said, “Sure, why 
                                                          
40 SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 28, 53-56. See generally Rhonda 
Copelon, Bringing Beijing Home, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 599 (1996) (quoting 
the Beijing Declaration that “women’s rights are human rights”); Berta 
Esperanza Hernandez-Tryol, Sex, Culture, and Rights: A 
Re/Conceptualization of Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60 ALB. L. 
REV. 607, 629 (1997) (noting that at the 1993 World Conference on Human 
Rights in Vienna, women participants insisted that because the 
“disempowerment of women is based on the public/private dichotomy,” 
violence against women must be included on the agenda). 
41 See Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action, ¶¶ 112-17 (Oct. 1995), available at http://www.un.org/ 
womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/violence.htm. 
42 In June 2000, the United Nations held a five-year implementation 
review of the Fourth World Conference on women (Beijing Plus Five). For a 
detailed summary, see International Policy UN Conferences: Fourth World 
Conference on Women + 5, 2000, available at http://www.iwhc.org/ 
index.cfm. (stating that “feminist advocates and activists from more than 
1,000 nongovernmental organizations met with government delegates from 
148 countries to review progress made since the 1995 Fourth World 
Conference on Women and to agree on further actions needed to accelerate 
implementation of the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action”). 
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not.” So, now we have polygamy as well. I heard another talk 
about widowhood rituals as violence against women. This is 
again a very large, growing, and hopefully not ultimately 
incoherent category of behavior. The drawback of expanding the 
definition of violence against women is potential incoherence. 
I think the human rights framework offers another advantage 
that Liz suggests, and that I would like to underscore. You can 
think about problems as human rights violations that can then 
become gendered. It is a way of expanding the definition of the 
problem. She gives the example of Maquiladora export 
processing zones in Mexico where there is a human rights 
concern about excluding pregnant women from the workplace.43 
This provides an opportunity to reexamine questions of equality 
in workplaces and exclusionary legislation concerning pregnancy 
elsewhere in the U.S. I have watched this in other human rights 
debates where issues that are not always thought of in gender 
terms become re-gendered. For example, there is a lot of talk 
about effects of conflict on populations that become refugees in 
armed conflict, and there is now an effort to look at the fact that 
this is disproportionately affecting women and children.44 So you 
can gender the effects of armed conflict. Refugees, women and 
children are disproportionately victims.45 Women are subject to 
violence in refugee camps; their partners have nothing to do; they 
have no protection; they are living under plastic sheets. Thus, 
they are in a sense more vulnerable to this problem. 
                                                          
43 SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 56 (using “the legal treatment of pregnant 
workers in the maquiladora” as an example of a problem that exists in this 
country as well but is not currently a focus of advocacy). 
44 See, e.g., Amy Beth Abbott, Child Soldiers—The Use of Children As 
Instruments of War, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 499, 504 (2000); 
Judith Gardam, Women and the Law of Armed Conflict: Why the Silence?, 46 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 55 (1997); Judith Gardam & Michelle Jarvis, Women 
and Armed Conflict: The International Response to the Beijing Platform for 
Action, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2000); Stuart Maslen, Relevance of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child to Children in Armed Conflict, 6 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 329 (1996). 
45 See generally Gardam & Jarvis, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 11 
(highlighting the impact of landmines in armed conflict and their effect on the 
world’s refugee population, the majority of which are women and children). 
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Globalization is increasing poverty in rural areas of the global 
south, and it is often women and girls who fall disproportionately 
into poverty.46 
One of the recent interesting discussions is about the effect of 
AIDS, looked at in a gendered way. The rate of increase of 
AIDS among teenagers in southern Africa is five or six times as 
high for girls as for boys.47 This is probably because girls marry 
older, more sexually experienced men, and as wives, they cannot 
really ask for safe sex.48 To look at the gender dimension of these 
problems and to think about them globally as violence is quite 
interesting. In discussions of racism, again it is women of color 
who are more often victims. Trafficked women are often women 
of color.49 Those who have difficulty with exclusion from work 
                                                          
46 See Press Kit, Fact Sheet No. 1: The Feminization of Poverty, Special 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Women 2000: Gender 
Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century (June 2000), 
at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/session/presskit/fs1.htm.  
See also Zillah Eisenstein, Stop Stomping on the Rest of Us: Retrieving 
Publicness from the Privatization of the Globe, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 59, 87 (1996). 
47 The United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS found that there are 
roughly 13.3 million women living in Sub-Saharan Africa with HIV/AIDS 
compared to 10.9 million men. Moreover, around twelve to thirteen million 
women become newly infected with HIV for every ten million men. Gender 
and HIV, United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (Mar. 2001), available at 
http://www.unaids.org/fact_sheets/files/GenderFS_en.doc. See also R.W. 
Johnson, Analysis: Infant Rape Captures AIDS Crisis, United Press 
International, Nov. 24, 2001 (stating that “statistics show that women catch 
HIV far more easily than men and because men tend to be attracted to younger 
women, the HIV rates among teenage girls are far higher than among boys,” 
and asserting that this knowledge of young women in their early twenties 
dying of AIDS has become quite common, making girls of younger and 
younger ages vulnerable to men who believe that only sex with a virgin will 
cleanse them of the spell of AIDS). 
48 See WHO, Fact Sheet No. 242: Women and HIV/AIDS (2000), at 
http://www.who.int/inf-fs/en/fact242.html (reporting that African women are 
expected to marry or have relations with older men). See also Tina Susman, 
Staggering Numbers in Africa/Young Women Losing AIDS Battle, NEWSDAY, 
July 13, 2000, at A38 (reporting that girls in male-dominated societies are 
afraid to demand use of condoms). 
49 See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hernandez, Latinas, Culture & Human 
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are not just people of color but often women of color.50 Again, 
you can see what adding gender does to this issue. I think this is 
a very productive way to think about a range of issues of violence 
against women, which brings us back to the larger, more 
structural kind of analysis where feminism began. 
In a sense, this is the upbeat part of the book, this is the hope 
for the future. I wish I could be quite as optimistic as this little 
description of mine has just sounded, and as I think Liz wants to 
be, but I find reasons for some pessimism, as I said earlier. 
There is a lot at stake here; there is a lot of resistance globally to 
undermining marriage structures.51 I see a strong tendency to 
introduce the same kinds of individual rights-based approaches 
that we have tried and found difficult and problematic in the 
United States. Among others, there are efforts to establish 
                                                          
Rights: A Model for Making Change, Saving a Soul, 23 WOMEN’S RTS. L. 
REP. 21, 24 (2001) (asserting that, along with dire social, political, civil and 
cultural biases for mistreatment, race becomes a significant factor often 
resulting in disparately high occurrences of trafficking amongst women of 
color). See generally Anita Sinha, Domestic Violence and U.S. Asylum Law: 
Eliminating the “Cultural Hook” for Claims Involving Gender Related 
Prosecution, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1562 (2001). 
50 See generally Mary K. O’Melveny, Playing the Gender Card: 
Affirmative Action and Working Women, 84 KY. L.J. 863, 891 (1995); 
Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives of Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
1163, 1173, 1179 (1988); Symposium, Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s: 
Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall, Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of 
Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 CAL. L. REV. 775, 779 
(1991). 
51 Global efforts by women activists in this area have led to international 
conferences in Nairobi in 1985 and Beijing in 1995. In addition, activists’ 
efforts resulted in the appointment of a United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Violence. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 53-54. However, there has been 
widespread criticism of the lack of concrete results. Id. at 54. The United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence recently issued a report criticizing 
foreign governments for a “lack of strategies of implementation on 
commitments to eradicate violence” and their overwhelming failure to meet 
international obligations to prevent, investigate, and prosecute domestic abuse. 
Id. See also Gustavo Capdevila, Gov’t Indifferent to Domestic Violence, U.N. 
Says, INTERPRESS SERV., Apr. 19, 1999; Hilary Charlesworth, The Mid-Life 
Crisis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 781, 794 (1998). 
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shelters, to have mandatory arrests, no-drop prosecution, and to 
mount legal defenses for women who kill their batterers. I 
recently found myself sitting in a room in Beijing talking to a 
group of women who asked me, “How do I start a shelter?” On 
the one hand, this is very important; on the other hand, we have 
been through a lot of issues around what makes shelters work, 
and it is going to be a complicated problem to make one work in 
Beijing. I think this makes Schneider’s book important to the 
global movement. It is valuable to show how these mechanisms 
have and have not developed and functioned in the U.S. from the 
perspective of a legal scholar and activist. This book is invaluable 
for the global movement, and I think activists in different parts of 




On that note of instability and hope and transition, we will 




My existence is one of transition from the Netherlands to the 
United States, going back and forth between the two countries. In 
this context, with all its inherent disruptions, my comments 
reflect this condition. 
Let me first and foremost compliment Liz Schneider on her 
book; it is unique and important in its presentation and analysis. 
It is timely in the sense that it presents a thorough and 
comprehensive history of the development of the many various 
legal battles that have been fought in the American battered 
women’s movement at a moment in history that feminist legal 
politics in the domain of domestic violence seem to have entered 
mainstream politics, certainly in the United States.52 The book 
contains a wealth of information, and one of the many things I 
really like about it is that it is written in a very accessible way. 
When covering both developments in academic theoretical 
                                                          
52 SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 12-20, 42-45. 
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debates and developments in legal practice and activism in the 
U.S., it is a laudable accomplishment to present the material in 
such a way that makes it accessible to a wide audience without 
simplifying its complexity. In that respect, Liz Schneider’s work 
in general, not only this book, provides important and valuable 
resources to activists as well as scholars. I want to thank her for 
that. I very much agree with Sally that this book deserves to be 
read widely, both in the United States and internationally! It 
provides important insights about the gains and the losses that 
legal struggles inevitably imply. 
As a feminist academic coming from the Netherlands, who 
has worked as a researcher in the field of domestic violence for a 
good part of the last twenty years, and now lives in the U.S., I 
will comment on Schneider’s book from a Western European 
perspective. What can we in a European context learn from 
American feminist-inspired legal developments where the topic of 
domestic violence has been subject to elaborate law-making as 
well as policy development? What kind of inspiration does the 
American experience offer, given that American feminist legal 
developments take place in a different socio-legal context 
compared to Western Europe? Is more legal regulation actually 
an advantage? Besides my praise for Schneider’s book, which is 
admittedly too brief, I will focus on the two issues from the book 
that have inspired me to critical reflection. 
The first point that is particularly appropriate to raise in a law 
and society context concerns the relationship between social and 
legal developments. What are the implications of the shift that the 
concept of the battered woman seems to have made from a social 
category in the early 1970s, launched by a social and political 
feminist movement, to a legal category in the 1990s (particularly 
in the U.S.) that has entered mainstream politics? This first point 
touches upon Schneider’s discussion of the dialectical relationship 
between law and its social and educational effects.53 The second 
point is an issue that Schneider herself addresses throughout the 
book, but especially toward the end: what are the limits and the 
possibilities of the kind of political or social transformation that 
                                                          
53 Id. at 199-200. 
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law can bring about? And, most importantly, what are the 
dilemmas that feminist law reformers confront? In that respect, 
my comments might overlap with some of Sally Merry’s 
remarks. I will concentrate on what I consider to be the 
unintended consequences of legal regulation. 
My first point concerns what Schneider labels the dialectical 
process of lawmaking. We are at the point in history when the 
category of the battered woman seems to have shifted in a 
political-strategic context from a primarily social to a 
predominantly legal category. The battered woman is the subject 
(and object) of increasing regulation that, in theory, is intended 
to support and/or protect victims. This regulation often has law 
as its basic vehicle, certainly in the U.S. What struck me 
throughout the book is Schneider’s emphasis on the positive facts 
of that shift. And she has valid reasons for so doing. The 
problem of wife abuse in the U.S. has definitely shifted—no 
matter how ambiguously—from a private problem to be dealt 
with in shame, if not in silence, by the individuals concerned to a 
social concern that receives public attention and is the subject of 
various public interventions. There has been a development of  
public concern and responsibility to intervene in which legal 
change has acted as an important vehicle. In that respect the book 
illuminates the dialectical relationship between the social and the 
legal domain. At the same time, Schneider presents an impressive 
collection of data that illustrates the underlying tension inherent 
in this shift. Despite the fact that battering has moved into the 
public domain and that the public discourse, as rhetoric and as 
praxis, has expanded, particularly through the invocation of law, 
the implementation of law to address domestic violence often 
relegates it to the private sphere. The DeShaney case is a very 
tragic example of this problem.54 In other words, the 
implementation of legal regulation of wife battering turns out to 
be very ambiguous and full of resistance against taking public 
                                                          
54 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 
189, 195-97 (1989) (ruling that the state lacks any affirmative obligation to 
prevent domestic violence or to protect individuals against it if the source of 
harm is private). 
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responsibility. Schneider emphasizes that traditional notions of 
privacy as justification for non-intervention sustain violence.55 
But I think that the underlying public-private analysis 
disadvantages battered women in more complex and paradoxical 
ways than Schneider lays out in her book. 
First, emphasizing the negative consequences of the ideology 
of privacy, i.e. as justifying non-intervention and leaving victims 
of battering without de facto and de jure protection, has 
paradoxically also led to a social and legal climate in the U.S. 
where legally-based criminal justice interventions in the private 
domain are currently advocated as necessary and legitimate, even 
against the wishes of the victim. The most obvious example is the 
institutionalization of mandatory arrest laws or no-drop policies. 
Mandatory arrest is critiqued as too blunt an instrument to 
demonstrate the state’s commitment to take responsibility for 
responding to wife abuse and too problematic an intervention into 
private life, disproportionately affecting women of color.56 
                                                          
55 SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 15-20, 88-94, 97. 
56 A number of commentators have noted the problems inherent in 
mandatory arrest laws. See, e.g., Donna Coker, Shifting the Power for 
Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1042-49 (2000) (noting inappropriate arrests and 
prosecution of battered women under mandatory arrest laws, poor women’s 
exposure to state control when jurisdictions require police to report each 
domestic violence call as suspected child abuse, and mandatory arrest policies 
creating backlash against low-income women); Linda Mills, Killing Her Softly: 
Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
550, 555, 565 (1999) (arguing that the very state interventions designed to 
help battered women often replicate the emotional abuse of the battering 
relationship, and that studies on mandatory arrests have shown that the 
frequency of repeat violence against battered women increased when those 
arrested were unemployed, African-American, or high school dropouts); 
Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence 
Cases, UMKC L. REV. 33, 71-78 (2000) (noting the various criticisms of 
mandatory arrests as paternalistic, disempowering, and likely to increase 
violence for women who are African-American or whose abusers are 
unemployed); Joan Zorza, Must We Stop Arresting Batterers? Analysis and 
Policy Implications of New Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 929, 930-31 (1994) (noting that the issue of mandatory arrest cannot 
be seen in isolation and is impacted by prosecutorial decision-making and 
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Nevertheless, these critiques are considered of secondary 
importance, and they have not changed the increasing 
implementation nationwide of these policies.57 Advocates argue 
that it is the responsibility of the state to unequivocally and firmly 
sanction and punish criminal, violent behavior in the family.58 
The argument that the offender’s arrest and prosecution might 
entail an intervention in the victim’s private life that she did not 
intend or want is considered to be understandable at best, but 
irrelevant in the process of legal implementation. This is a direct 
consequence of the shift of wife abuse from the private to the 
public domain and illustrates how the underlying binary of the 
public and the private is upheld and has, in the implementation of 
its consequences, been simply turned into its opposite. In other 
words, the complexity and nuance in analysis, in which wife 
abuse is perceived as a public and private problem 
simultaneously, with all the complexities and ambiguities that that 
brings for both victims and lawmakers, has hardly been 
                                                          
follow-through subsequent to arrest). 
57 See Somini Sengupta, Domestic Violence Law Set for Renewal, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 2001, available at http://college3.nytimes.com/guests/ 
articles/2001/06/11/851359.xml (“Over the last decade . . . most states have 
instituted mandatory-arrest laws, according to the National Coalition Against 
Domestic Violence, an umbrella group of advocates.”). See also ROBERT L. 
SNOW, FAMILY ABUSE: TOUGH SOLUTIONS TO STOP THE VIOLENCE, 260-61 
(Plenum Trade ed., Plenum Publ’g Corp. 1997). 
58 Some advocates argue that domestic violence is a public crime and 
therefore the state has a responsibility to “intervene aggressively” in order to 
“communicate[] and follow[] through on the message that the state will not 
tolerate violence of any sort.” Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated 
Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1849, 1865 (1996). Some further argue that the state condones and promotes 
violence when it refuses to intervene. Id. See also Matthew Litsky, Explaining 
the Legal System’s Inadequate Response to the Abuse of Women: A Lack of 
Coordination, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 149 (1990) (arguing for state 
intervention through the coordination of the legislature, police, prosecutors, 
and judiciary); Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System’s Response to a 
Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. 
REV. 267 (1985) (contending that “[f]ull-scale, vigorous legal response to 
battering remains the exception and not the rule” and recommending stronger 
intervention by police, prosecutors, and judiciary). 
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acknowledged. The problem with mandatory interventions in 
wife battering is that political recognition of this as a public 
problem risks eclipsing the private interests that women, as 
agents, maintain. As a response to the claim that wife battering is 
a social problem that requires the state to take public 
responsibility, the baby is sometimes thrown out with the bath 
water. The fact that law, notably criminal law, has been used as a 
major vehicle to materialize this public responsibility, only 
exacerbates this dynamic. Law, as the motor of regulation based 
on general rules and principles that operate within an either/or 
paradigm, is by definition not well suited to address the messy 
complexities of public violence in the private home.59 
Secondly, this shift to defining the battered woman as a 
public identity—in the United States as a legal identity60—
deserves to be analyzed in an American socio-legal context. 
Maybe we are facing a typical American development given 
America’s “love affair with law,” a phenomenon that is quite 
striking from a Western European perspective and not as 
prominently developed in Western Europe.61 Battering has 
entered the public domain in the U.S. through a rights regime. In 
Europe—not only in the Netherlands, but also in the U.K., where 
there is even more of a rights regime than in the Netherlands, 
Germany, France, or other European countries—we see a 
different approach than that used in the United States. Without 
wanting to sound too optimistic, in Western European countries 
there is more of a balance between the legal and the social 
category and the social policy strategies that the battered 
                                                          
59 See also Renée Römkens, Protecting Prosecution, CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY (forthcoming 2002). 
60 See supra note 11 (regarding the United States battered women’s 
movement); infra note 64 (regarding the Violence Against Women Act of 
1994). 
61 See, e.g., Susan L. Miller & Rosemary Barberet, A Cross-Cultural 
Comparison of Social Reform: The Growing Pains of the Battered Women’s 
Movements in Washington, D.C. and Madrid, Spain, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 
923 (1994) (concluding that criminal justice respondents in the United States 
advocated arrests in conjunction with social services, while in Spain, these 
respondents were more reluctant to endorse criminal sanctions). 
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women’s movements have pursued in trying to devise supportive 
policies, such as obtaining funding for shelters and hot lines.62 In 
Western Europe the issue of battering has been a much more 
effective domain of socio-political struggle than in the U.S. It is 
an important point to bear in mind that when reflecting on the 
relevance of American feminist legal achievements in an 
international context. These achievements need to be socially and 
culturally contextualized. We have to assess critically how 
successful the political strategy has been to focus on legalizing 
the identity of the battered woman as a vehicle to gain, among 
other things, political and community support, public attention, 
and state intervention. 
That brings me to the second and more general point: what 
are the limits and the possibilities of law? In her book, Schneider 
focuses on the possibilities of law. Obviously, law is an 
important and sometimes necessary instrument in the sense that it 
can facilitate the translation of a social problem into a subject of 
public concern and even public responsibility that provides 
citizens with an entitlement to public care, concern, protection or 
support. Schneider’s book stimulates us to think about what we 
need and want from law from a feminist social justice 
perspective. In addition to important issues that Schneider raises, 
we need a better understanding of the structural limitations that 
are inherent in law. Law is inevitably an instrument of 
governance, a powerful instrument in the hands of legislators, 
administrators, governments and their representatives, deployed 
in order to regulate society and its citizens. What is particularly 
                                                          
62 The European Union has established three priorities in combating 
violence: the enactment of legislation; the enforcement of that legislation; and 
the modification of societal attitudes and stereotypes. See EU Reaffirms 
Commitment to Punishing Violence Against Women, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS 
SERV., Mar. 7, 2002. The European Union has enacted Daphne, an action 
program that does not focus predominantly on criminal legal projects, unlike 
most VAWA grants in the United States. The E.U. program, Daphne, funds 
forty-seven projects aimed at “combating violence against women and 
children.” See Press Release, Commission of the European Communities, The 
European Commission Supports Fight Against Violence to Women and 
Children (Dec. 20, 2000). 
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telling is that the legalizing tendency discussed before is so 
profoundly dominated by criminal law. Is the feminist social 
movement to be remembered for its influence on criminal law, as 
Sanford Kadish recently indicated?63 The question then becomes, 
if this is a victory, might it resemble a Pyrrhic victory, one that 
implies substantial damage? The overinvestment in criminal legal 
interventions within the Violence Against Women Act 
(“VAWA”) and the grants that flow from VAWA—millions of 
dollars going to support pilot projects and fund research into 
criminal justice interventions, notably mandatory arrest, and lack 
of support to the civil rights remedy—is more than just an 
unfortunate side effect.64 A criminal rights regime is by definition 
focused on control and punishment. It might reflect a tendency 
that represents the increasingly punitive attitude toward social ills 
and problems that is prominent in the United States.65 Domestic 
                                                          
63 In his recent essay on changes in the past fifty years in criminal law, 
Sanford Kadish views the influence of feminism on criminal law as a “social 
development to be remembered.” Sanford Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal 
Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 981 (1999). He points in 
particular to changes in rape law and in the law of self-defense. Id. at 975-79. 
64 Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”), Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title 
IV, 108 Stat. 1941 (codified as amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
VAWA, passed as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994, is a comprehensive effort to address the problem of violence 
against women through a variety of mechanisms, including increased funding 
for women’s shelters, a national domestic abuse hotline, rape education and 
prevention programs, and training for federal and state judges. SCHNEIDER, 
supra note 1, at 188-98. It provided for reform of remedies available to 
battered immigrant women, development of an innovative civil rights remedy, 
and a host of other provisions including criminal enforcement of interstate 
orders of protection. VAWA’s civil rights remedy created a federal civil rights 
cause of action so that all women who had been physically abused because of 
their gender could sue their attackers in federal court. It permitted 
compensatory and punitive damages as well as equitable relief. This provision, 
however, was held unconstitutional under United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 627 (2000) (concluding that Congress lacked constitutional authority 
under the Commerce Clause to enact VAWA since gender-motivated crimes 
were not considered economic activity). For a more thorough discussion of 
Morrison, see infra note 84. 
65 See GARLAND, supra note 32, at 52-60 (discussing a reversion to a 
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violence is more the subject of post-hoc, mostly criminal legal 
interventions and control of perpetrators than of prevention or 
support of victims.66 
We need to be aware of the limits of law, as well as of its 
contradictory effects, when it comes to bringing about social 
transformation, or bringing about social justice, in this case for 
battered women. Schneider’s work points out consistently that 
law, most notably criminal law, is not an easy tool with which to 
work. Its accessibility is limited, and, as Sally Merry mentioned 
already, lawyering in this domain is problematic. The legal 
process itself brings about many subversions of the original 
intentions of the law. From that perspective the term “feminist 
lawmaking,” although relevant on a descriptive level, sounds 
somewhat optimistic. The law in this domain does not just 
provide rights as trumps to be cashed in while struggling against 
violence against women and for social justice. Rights are equally, 
if not more, instruments to control, to monitor, and to subject the 
rights bearers to a regime that constitutes legal identities that do 
not necessarily serve the interests of the rights bearers who are 
initially looking for support. In this domain there are many 
compelling examples of how laws subvert their intended support. 
The “battered woman’s syndrome,”67 for example, is a very 
clear example, as are mandatory arrest laws. The term “feminist 
lawmaking” as the project that motivates this book pictures 
leading developments in this field as a politically emancipatory 
                                                          
more punitive criminal justice system). 
66 Domestic violence is another example of a social problem that has 
become subjugated through criminalization in the current “culture of control” 
as analyzed by David Garland. See GARLAND, supra note 32. For a critical 
analysis of the rights regime in the field of domestic violence, see Renée 
Römkens, Law As a Trojan Horse: Unintended Consequences of Rights-Based 
Interventions to Support Battered Women, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 265 
(2001). See also Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in 
Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 802-
05 (2001) (arguing that the litmus test for measuring effective laws or policies 
for battered women should be whether legal or social service interventions 
enhance women’s access to material resources). 
67 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing “battered 
woman syndrome”). 
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project. In doing so, it pictures the law from a slightly modernist 
perspective as a mechanism that brings about progress. Laws in 
the domain of battering certainly bring a civilizing message that it 
is morally wrong and illegal. Of course, I agree with the 
message. But using the law as an instrument to bring that 
message across means the invocation of an instrument that 
demands a considerable price. In that respect, the book appears 
to reflect an optimism about what law can accomplish. This same 
optimism that I read in it, seductive as it is, has inspired me to 
reflect on the limitations of law and how this might be related to 
politics of rights.68 From an international perspective it is 
important to learn lessons from these achievements in addition to 
the counterproductive effect of feminist legal struggles in the 
United States and elsewhere. This book documents a crucial part 




I have a question, Renée. When you stated that from the 
European perspective the relationship between social categories 
and legal categories is more balanced in contrast to the American 
viewpoint, I wondered whether politics regarding services have 
experiences similar to or different from changes in the United 
States. For example, has there been a professionalization of anti-
domestic violence services? Liz commented that one objective 
she had in writing the book was to reconnect gender to 
violence.69 This is also part of her argument on refueling social 
movements and the challenges faced as a result of 
professionalization. Would you comment on the professional-
ization of services from a European view? I tend to think that in 
the U.S. legalization is often confused with and coupled with 
professionalization. 
 
                                                          
68 For a more elaborate discussion of the flipside of the politics of rights 
for battered women, see Römkens, supra note 66. 
69 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 232 (arguing for the need to link 
violence to gender inequality). 
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Betsy Stanko 
 
If you do not mind, Chris, as an audience member I would 
like to respond to your question. One of the observations I have 
made after living in London for the last twenty years (after 
previously living in the U.S.) is about the differences between a 
U.S. and European perspective on the use of law in domestic 
violence situations. I have asked myself about the impact of the 
decline of the welfare state in the U.S. on the emergence of law 
as the primary remedy to many harms. In the U.K., for example, 
we still have a welfare state. The government not only believes in 
the public sector but also has a real desire to respond to the needs 
of people.70 Much of the activist feminist politics in and around 
the violence against women movement in the U.K. expects to 
engage the entire public sector, not only the arm of the law.71 
Campaigns to involve the public sector in responses to domestic 
violence include a second layer of government, such as the local 
authority or the local health authority, in the provision of help 
and assistance.72 
                                                          
70 The British government established a Social Exclusion Unit in Downing 
Street to create cross-departmental, integrated solutions to the problems of 
those who fall through the welfare net. The unit has established eighteen 
policy action teams to address the problems, including homelessness, poor 
education, crime, inner city regeneration, and drug addiction. See Social 
Security: Government Policy, UK: MEDIUM-TERM POLITICAL OUTLOOK, Jan. 
30, 2002. 
71 In the U.K. methods to cope with domestic violence engage the entire 
public sector. Several examples include public awareness campaigns about 
sexual and physical violence against women, training programs for public 
services providers, and distribution of leaflets and good practice guidelines 
instructing women and service providers on handling domestic violence. See 
Betsy Stanko, A Profile of Violence Against Women, Criminal Justice 
Conference-Violence Against Women (Nov. 24-25, 1999), available at 
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/domesticviolence/stanko.htm. Such public efforts 
have not infringed on law enforcement reform. Id.; see also infra note 72 on 
the high degree of police involvement in Britain’s domestic violence 
movement. Improving law enforcement’s understanding of domestic violence 
issues remains a critical objective for feminist politics in the U.K. See 
generally infra note 72. 
72 Great Britain’s approach to domestic violence also utilizes a high 
SCHNEIDERMACRO 7-11FINALWINTRO.DOC 7/24/02  1:18 PM 
348 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
I find myself appalled by the lack of social safety net in the 
United States. In European life, the law and the police are only 
one part of a solution to domestic violence. In the U.K. we 
cannot even mandate arrest in domestic violence situations. But 
under European rights legislation, we can begin to re-
conceptualize the need—indeed the duty—to protect people from 
harm.73 I now hear police officers saying we have to do 
something more in domestic violence situations because we have 
a duty to protect. It is a new discourse. This is one hook that the 
police in particular are using to make the health service devise 
plans to protect people from domestic violence. So the police, as 
one agent of law, are challenging others in the public sector to 
take notice of domestic violence. This makes a huge difference in 
                                                          
degree of involvement by the centralized government through its criminal 
justice system. See Rebecca Morley & Audrey Mullender, Police Research 
Group, Preventing Domestic Violence to Women, in CRIME PREVENTION UNIT 
SERIES: PAPER NO. 48, at 36 (Gloria Laycock ed., 1994). The hallmark 1990 
Home Office Circular recommending police forces to develop strategies to 
take positive, pro-arrest action against assailants of domestic violence victims 
resulted in the proliferation of domestic violence units (“DVUs”); 
furthermore, the police were the first statutory agencies created to achieve 
accountability to the community with respect to domestic violence. See id. at 
16-17. In addition, police policies are encouraged to maintain a pro-charge 
attitude when prosecuting domestic violence offenders, although these policies 
may not be entirely effective. Carolyn Hoyle & Andrew Sanders, Police 
Response to Domestic Violence, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 14 (2000) (writing that 
pro-arrest and pro-charge policies do not necessarily achieve results preferred 
by victims themselves of cessation of violence). Community support through 
refuges, support groups, and crisis services has also been emphasized. See 
Morley & Mullender, supra at 30-34. Government policies continue to 
emphasize close relationships between crime-fighters and social welfare 
agencies, as well as police involvement. Jalna Hanmer & Sue Griffiths, 
Reducing Domestic Violence . . . What Works? Policing Domestic Violence, 
CRIME REDUCTION RESEARCH SERIES (Jan. 2000), at http://www. 
homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/poldv.pdf. 
73 See generally Subrata Paul, Combating Domestic Violence Through 
Positive International Action in the International Community and in the United 
Kingdom, India, and Africa, 7 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 227 (1999); 
Susan Smolens, Violence Against Women: Consciousness and Law in Four 
Central European Emerging Democracies—Poland, Hungrary, Slovakia, and 
the Czech Republic, 15 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L. F. 1 (2001). 
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There are so many wonderful things about this book I could 
spend my whole few minutes just talking about the things I 
admire. But I do not want to do that, in part because I have said 
many of those things in print,74 and in part because I would like 
to engage with you today on two particular issues: the question of 
privacy and the point both Liz and Renée have made about 
Americans seeming to think of legal solutions and legal remedies 
first before we consider other solutions to social problems. To 
take the second point first, I think you are quite right in this 
book, Liz, about the primacy Americans have placed on legal 
rather than other solutions, and I have wondered why that is so. 
The suggestion—a very useful observation—has been made that it 
has something to do with the sort of social safety net that exists in 
other countries but is increasingly dwindling in the United States. 
I have been thinking about this because we have been traveling 
around a little bit in Eastern Europe before landing here in 
Budapest. Everywhere we have been, we have seen castles. We 
visited several and were shown, among other things, treasure 
troves of ancestral monarchies. I kept thinking, why is it I have 
gone for years without seeing a castle (at least since my kid got 
too old to go to Disneyland), and now that I am in Europe, I 
spend every other day in one? We do not have such a tradition in 
the U.S. We have never had a king; we do not have much of a 
shared history. 
The United States is an enormous country; it is increasingly 
diverse; it is very violent. Many people who live in it consider 
they do not share a great deal with all of their fellow 
countrymen. The one thing that we do share, on the whole, is a 
commitment to what we rather grandly call the Rule of Law. It is 
not always such a grand thing, and it is not always benign. 
Nevertheless, I think that is why we think of the law first, Renée, 
                                                          
74 Wesson, supra note 1, at 23. 
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because we do not have anything else to appeal as a source of our 
commonality or our national identity. We have this phrase—it is 
a sexist phrase, but it is still useful—“We are a nation of laws, 
not men.”75 The phrase implies that leaders and dynasties—we 
undeniably still have those—will come and go, but the one thing 
that will remain at bedrock is the rule of law. Of course, we still 
struggle over its meaning. But I believe that is the reason we 
think of the law so constantly and insistently, in a way a 
European finds, no doubt, peculiar. 
I want to say that one of the things I admire so much about 
Liz’s book is her optimism. I know it is hard to share it all the 
time. But I like reading something that reflects that “glass-is-half-
full” attitude, especially after being at this conference. I have 
been at quite a few panels, which I felt were all good, some 
brilliant; however, it occurred to me that the official attitude of 
this conference is pessimism. There might be a generic title 
applicable to every panel that would be something like “an 
exquisitely nuanced and profoundly insightful discussion of a 
confessedly insoluble problem.” They mostly conclude, “Huh, 
nothing can be done.” Or perhaps the more optimistic panels 
conclude, “There is a great deal of work that remains to be 
done.” 
It is refreshing to encounter a divergence. I rarely encounter a 
piece of writing that makes me feel like I want to go do this 
work. Yes, of course there is a great deal of work remaining, and 
Liz’s book serves as a useful inventory of what it might be. But it 
is not said in a passive voice. It is said this way: “Look, let us 
roll up our sleeves. There is a lot that remains to be done.” So I 
like the way reading this book renewed in me the spirit of 
commitment to the solution of this problem, even though the path 
to a solution is not always clear. 
I can only talk about this problem from my own position as 
an American, a lawyer, and a former prosecutor. I tend to think 
                                                          
75 John Adams, Thoughts on Government, Jan. 1776, available at 
http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/ja2/writings/tog.html (“[N]o good government 
[exists] but what is republican . . . [and] the very definition of a republic is ‘an 
empire of laws, and not of men.’”). 
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of those immediately as the aspects of my own identity that I can 
mobilize in thinking about solving this problem, although those 
are not the only helpful identities. 
Now let me turn to the question of privacy and privatization. 
Catharine MacKinnon once said—I think she was quoting 
someone else—“Privacy is an injury got up as a gift.”76 She was 
talking about the interest of women, of course. I have thought 
about that phrase often. Usually, when people talk about privacy 
they are talking about the gift—something desired, something 
sought after. Do not get me wrong. I like my privacy as much as 
the next person. I have never understood why for a few years 
teenagers wanted to be Madonna, the woman who never has any 
privacy. Even when she goes to the dentist, there is someone 
there with a camera to record it. That just never appealed to me 
at all. But I do think that the regime of privacy and the increasing 
privatization of things once regarded as matters in the public 
sphere carries with it many dangers for the vulnerable, and 
especially for women. 
I have heard a lot about privatization in attending various 
panels at this conference. For example, speaking globally—and I 
can only speak in a very general way because I do not have a lot 
of expertise here—I have heard a lot of talk about growing 
national deference to private economic arrangements. There is an 
entire regime of international agreements that seek to 
institutionalize and make permanent this deference by 
governments to private economic arrangements,77 a kind of 
privatization of the international economy coupled with measures 
designed to discourage regulation that might make it less of a 
brutal capitalistic enterprise. Whether that is good or bad, I do 
not think anyone can deny that that we are seeing a trend. It is in 
                                                          
76 CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON 
LIFE AND LAW 10 (Harv. Univ. Press 1987). 
77 See generally Gordon A. Christenson, Federal Courts and World Civil 
Society, 6 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 405, 431 (1997) (explaining that 
treaties are interpreted as self-executing when private economic or commercial 
interests are protected); Neil Munro, Cybercrime Treaty on Trial, NAT’L J., 
Mar. 10, 2001 (discussing an anti-crime treaty being drafted in Europe and 
how privacy advocates feel this may undermine economic growth). 
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part the product of a kind of utilitarian argument that seems to be 
at its maximum influence these days, the proposition that 
government is less efficient than private institutions at the 
promotion of certain kinds of social goods. 
At this conference I have also heard about the proliferation of 
a regime of private decision-making, frequently by arbitration. In 
the United States, for example, if you sign a contract for the 
purchase of goods, it is very likely that, if there is any kind of 
formality at all to the agreement, you sign away your right to 
bring litigation against the manufacturer or seller of those 
goods.78 You are required, if there is a dispute, to submit to 
arbitration.79 And the agreement might even provide that the 
seller of the goods will designate the arbitrator. As a result, you 
as the consumer give away your right to a public remedy in favor 
of an agreement (which is extorted from you because it is the 
only way you can buy the camera or whatever it is you want). 
The purchasing public has no other choice but to submit to the 
privatization of dispute resolution. 
Privatization arrangements also prevail in many sorts of 
employment agreements.80 We have seen in the United States 
                                                          
78 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 
(1987) (stating that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, establishes a 
federal policy favoring arbitration and requires courts to rigorously enforce 
agreements to arbitrate). 
79 See, e.g., Taubman v. Prospect Drilling & Sawing, Inc., 469 N.W.2d 
335 (Minn. App. 1991) (discussing how the Minnesota Sales Representative 
Act, Minnesota’s version of the Uniform Securities Act, requires disputes to 
be submitted to arbitration); Helena Chemical Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 
492 (Tex. 2001) (discussing the requirement to submit to arbitration in the 
context of sales of goods). See also Richard A. Bales, A New Direction for 
American Labor Law, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1863, 1912 (1994) (surveying 
Supreme Court cases demonstrating judicial receptiveness to arbitration clause 
enforcement in commercial sales contracts and judicial interpretation of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1-14). 
80 See, e.g., John-Paul Motley, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements in 
Employment Contracts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 687, 688 (1998) (stating that 
employment lawyers began encouraging employers to insert binding 
arbitration clauses into all employment contracts and other agreements). See 
generally Cole v. Burns Int’l Secretary Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
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Supreme Court within the last couple of years an endorsement of 
the legality and propriety of these kinds of arrangements, in 
which people sign away their right to seek a public remedy in 
favor of a privatized remedy.81 Our president has initiated a 
discussion about the desirability of privatizing much or all of our 
Social Security system,82 which is the system of old age pensions 
for people in the United States. It has always been organized as a 
public agency, administered by public servants who were 
answerable, as governmental agencies are, but powerful interests 
promote to substitute this public system for a private one by 
making security in one’s old age an individual matter of 
accumulating money, investing it, and then moving one’s 
investment around in an entrepreneurial manner. So I see a lot of 
evidence that this trend toward privatization is continuing and 
accelerating, and I wonder what that means for the movement for 
the protection of battered and vulnerable women and children. 
One of the things that Liz talks about in her book is the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994.83 But as Renée mentions, 
in a development that came after the book was published, the 
                                                          
(discussing the Federal Arbitration Act in relation to employment contracts). 
81 See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 754, 762 (2002) 
(stating that the language of the Federal Arbitration Act manifests a policy 
favoring arbitration agreements); Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 
(2001) (ruling that employer’s action to compel employee into arbitration was 
proper and not exempt from the Federal Aviation Act); Green Tree Financial 
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (affirming the district 
court’s compelled arbitration); Cortez Byrd Chips v. Bill Harbert Construction 
Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000) (ruling that the Federal Arbitration Act’s venue 
provisions are permissive and allow a motion to confirm, vacate, or modify an 
arbitration award). 
82 See David W. Chen, The Social Security Debate Plays San Diego, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2001, at A12. In May 2001, President George W. Bush 
created the commission to develop proposals to overhaul the social security 
program including private investment accounts. See President’s Commission to 
Strengthen Social Security, at http://www.csss.gov (last visited Apr. 21, 
2002). 
83 The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title 
IV, 108 Stat. 1941 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
See supra note 64. 
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United States Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison 
declared unconstitutional the civil rights remedy of the Violence 
Against Women Act, the portions that would have given women 
who were victims of gender-motivated violence a right to seek a 
private remedy in the federal courts of the United States.84 One 
can put forth various explanations of this decision, but to me it 
represents a rather subtle statement of the old premise that this 
kind of violence really is a private matter. It is not important 
enough, and it does not have significant enough nation-wide 
effects for the federal courts to have any jurisdiction to consider 
it. It has to be considered (if at all) by local courts, by local 
authorities. State courts are all right for those cases, but the 
federal courts—the big courts, the important courts, the courts 
that deal with momentous matters significant to the nation and the 
nation’s health—really do not have any jurisdiction over this 
rather small private matter. I am being perhaps a bit sarcastic, 
                                                          
84 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The plaintiff in 
Morrison, Christy Brzonkala, a freshman at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 
alleged rape by two defendant varsity football players. After the university 
judicial committee failed to find sufficient evidence to punish them, the 
plaintiff brought civil suits against the university under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 
1681-88, for the handling of her complaint and against both varsity football 
players under 42 U.S.C. § 13981, codifying § 40302 of the Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1941-42, which provides that persons may 
receive compensatory, punitive, declarative, or injunctive relief from those 
who have deprived them of their right to be free from gender-motivated 
violence. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 604. The district court dismissed the 
plaintiff’s case against the university for failure to state a claim, concluding 
that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 604-05. In Morrison, the case against the 
football players, the Supreme Court held that Congress lacked constitutional 
power under the Commerce Clause even to provide a civil remedy for gender-
motivated violence, which the Court said constituted intrastate non-economic 
activity not substantially related to interstate commerce. Id. at 613-18, relying 
on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Court explicitly left 
open the possibility of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers to regulate non-
economic activities affecting interstate commerce, but declined to place 
gender-motivated violence within Congress’ power to regulate, fearing that 
permitting federal regulation of such an attenuated relationship to interstate 
commerce would over-broaden Congress’ regulatory powers. Id. at 614-16. 
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but I think that is a defensible reading of what the court was 
saying in Morrison.85 And if I am right in my reading of this case 
together with other developments in United States constitutional 
law, I see a gradual but relentless enlargement of this sphere of 
privacy, inside of which the government may not or will not be 
inclined to look. I do not think that is a good thing for vulnerable 
people or for battered women. 
You may know that the President of the United States, 
George W. Bush, when asked whom he would appoint to 
vacancies on the United States Supreme Court, if any should 
arise (as it is very likely that they will during his term), said he 
would like to appoint more justices like two of the present 
members of the court—Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia.86 So I 
am always interested in what these two jurists are saying and 
doing because it seems likely that they may be replicated before 
long. When I look at their decisions across a broad range of 
subject matters, I find that this concern with privacy, the 
protection of someone’s right to keep certain matters private and 
away from the gaze of the government, is a pervading theme, 
even when the question is one on which a person George W. 
Bush admires would take a different view. For example, Justices 
Scalia and Thomas are quite willing to vote against the 
government in matters involving criminal prosecution and in 
                                                          
85 Id. For further discussion of Morrison, see Julie Goldscheid, United 
States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against 
Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 109 (2000); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male 
Sovereignty: On United States V. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 (2000); 
Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 
111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001); Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: 
Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 269 (2000). 
86 Laurie Kellman, Bush, Gore Touted Different Justices, A.P. ONLINE, 
Dec. 11, 2000 (“Throughout the year, Bush tried to frame the issue in terms 
of philosophy, saying his ideal nominees would base their judgments strictly 
on the words of the Constitution. Pressed to name a justice who fits that mold, 
Bush pointed to Scalia and Thomas.”); Stephen B. Presser, How Bush Would 
Fix the Supremes, CHIC. TRIB., Nov. 5, 2000 (“Bush said he wants more 
justices like them [Scalia and Thomas].”). 
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favor of the defendant when they feel that the right to privacy is 
implicated.87 I am thinking especially of a recent decision 
addressing whether the police could use what is called a thermal 
imaging device to look—not look, literally, but to sense what was 
going on—inside the walls of a house.88 Thermal imaging devices 
are law enforcement tools used to detect activities like the 
cultivation of marijuana, which uses growing lamps that generate 
a certain amount of heat. Prior to this decision, the Court had 
found that, in some remarkably similar situations, there was no 
violation of our Constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.89 In this matter, however, the Court found 
differently, and Justices Scalia and Thomas were careful to state 
their view that—they did not quite put it this way, but they might 
as well have—a man’s house is his castle. And inside one’s 
                                                          
87 See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S 91 (1990) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., 
joining majority) (holding that overnight guest who stays in another’s house 
with the owner’s permission legitimately shares the owner’s expectation of 
privacy under the Fourth Amendment). But see Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 
S. Ct. 447, 458, 460-62 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ. 
dissenting) (joining Chief Justice Rehnquist in rejecting the majority’s finding 
that City of Indianapolis’ use of drug-sniffing dogs at traffic checkpoints 
violated the Fourth Amendment; finding, instead, a lowered level of Fourth 
Amendment protection in a car, as opposed to a private residence); Minnesota 
v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91-99 (1998) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring) 
(concurring with majority’s reasoning in denying Fourth Amendment 
protection from discovery of illegal activities by police officer who looked 
through window of the house where defendants were bagging cocaine). 
88 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (finding warrantless 
thermal imaging searches in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when 
used to detect emanations from the home). 
89 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that defendant had no 
reasonable expectation that his curtilage was protected from naked eye 
observation from a helicopter four-hundred feet above); California v. Ciraolo, 
476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding no Fourth Amendment violation when police 
officers trained in marijuana identification took aerial photographs of 
defendant’s property from a private plane prior to securing warrant); Dow 
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (holding that the EPA’s 
surveillance of defendant’s premises from a plane using an aerial mapping 
camera to enhance human vision did not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
violation). 
SCHNEIDERMACRO 7-11FINALWINTRO.DOC 7/24/02  1:18 PM 
 BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 357 
house, one is entitled to keep what is happening away from the 
view of the authorities.90 
There was another very overlooked decision about a year 
ago, a case called United States v. Hubbell,91 which involved a 
rather technical question. But in their concurring opinion in that 
case, Justices Thomas and Scalia declared a remarkably broad 
view of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, suggesting that a person has a right to refuse, for 
example, the drawing of blood or the taking of fingerprints, or 
speaking for voice print analysis, very standard techniques of law 
enforcement.92 This is a position that the Court has not taken or 
even considered seriously in about forty years.93 So I see all of 
these decisions as presaging a trend in our Supreme Court toward 
greater protection of the right of privacy, at least in one’s home 
and one’s person. 
Now this leads me to another point. Privacy is not a good that 
is lying around on the ground waiting for all of us to pick it up if 
we only are attracted to it. Privacy must be purchased like 
anything else. If you are not convinced, just try traveling around 
Europe for a while and staying some nights in lodgings that cost 
$25 a night and other nights in lodgings that cost $250 a night, 
and compare the amount of privacy you enjoy in those two kinds 
of lodgings. They are not the same because privacy is expensive. 
Privacy is far more available to those who have money to buy it 
than those who do not. The trend toward the enlargement of the 
sphere of privacy couples with my view that privacy is a good 
                                                          
90 Kyllo, 525 U.S. at 28, 34. 
91 530 U.S. 27 (2000). 
92 Id. at 49-56 (arguing the term, “witness,” has a broader meaning than 
that given by the majority, such that the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination would protect against the compelled production of not only 
incriminating testimony but also any other incriminating evidence, thus 
interpreting protection against searches and seizures to include a person’s 
refusal to comply with certain standard techniques of law enforcement). 
93 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (permitting the 
prosecution to compel production of self-incriminating evidence that lacked 
testimonial character). Cf. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 56 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ. 
concurring). 
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that can be purchased by the well-off, but is unaffordable to the 
poor, which deepens my concern about these developments. 
In conclusion, there are various developments in American 
constitutional law that point toward an increasing emphasis on the 
preservation of a private sphere behind an impenetrable veil. The 
analysis Liz provides in her book of the role that privacy has 
played in denying protection to battered women makes these 
developments especially troubling to me. At one point Liz 
recounts going to a demonstration, I think it was in Washington, 
D.C., and seeing a young woman holding a sign that said, “The 
power to stop violence against women begins with me.”94 Liz 
points out that this is in one way an inspiring message, because it 
is empowering; it suggests that each of us has the opportunity as 
individuals to do things to better our lives and protect ourselves.95 
It is also to some extent a discouraging message because it 
suggests that it is purely the responsibility of each woman to 
protect herself, and that public agencies and public officials have 
no obligations in that regard. Suppose that sign had said 
something just a little bit different. Suppose it had said, “The 
responsibility to stop violence against women belongs to you.” 
Or suppose it said, “The responsibility to stop violence against a 
woman belongs to that woman.” Now imagine that sign being 
held up not by a young girl but by the justices of the United 
States Supreme Court. I am afraid we are going in that direction. 





Liz, would you like to make a few comments, and then we 




Yes. Thanks to all of you for really full, rich readings of the 
                                                          
94 SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 231. 
95 Id. 
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book. I really appreciate the closeness of your analysis, and I am 
really interested in your reactions. It is always this amazing 
feeling when you write something. You have your own sense 
about what it is that you have sent out into the world. There then 
are all these different reactions to it and readings of it. People 
bring their own perspectives to it. Many of you saw the film 
yesterday, “Live Nude Girls Unite.”96 People watched this 
ninety-minute film, and everybody brought something different to 
the discussion afterwards. Some people brought labor history, 
and some people brought issues of motherhood, and some people 
brought questions of sexuality. It is always so interesting to hear 
people’s responses to what one has put “out there.” 
A lot of the issues that each of the readers have raised are 
issues about which I am continuing to think. Let me just try to 
highlight some of those issues. First, the point that both Sally and 
Renée made about criminalization is a question that I try to 
address in the book.97 I definitely see criminalization as a serious, 
serious issue, and the move to criminalize domestic violence in 
this country is very troubling. Indeed, the thesis of the book is 
that without a broader comprehension of a social welfare 
framework for understanding the interrelationship between 
violence and welfare, and women’s economic situation, and 
socialization, and sexual harassment, and all those things, we 
cannot really address the violence.98 Criminalization as a solution 
in itself is a big problem, and I discuss this problem in the book. 
Sally’s point about the convergence of issues that are coming 
together around criminalization is very valuable, and I agree with 
it. It is a very problematic move. It is a move that manifests the 
problem that I try to address in the book, that domestic violence 
is viewed as a problem in and of itself and not linked to the 
larger issues of women’s economic situation, gender 
socialization, sex segregation, reproduction, and women’s 
subjugation within the family. But I also think understanding the 
other forces that both Sally and Mimi are highlighting, which 
                                                          
96 LIVE NUDE GIRLS UNITE! (Julia Query & Vicky Funari, 2000). 
97 SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 6, 181-98. 
98 Id. at 6-8. 
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converge in that move towards criminalization, is very valuable. 
The international human rights piece that Sally brings up here 
is really fascinating. It is particularly wonderful, Sally, because 
this is something that I am working on in a new paper.99 In the 
book, I leave open the way in which these issues are reframed in 
the international human rights context. By coincidence, I have 
also been in China since I wrote the book and also experienced 
some of the inappropriateness of the American context. But there 
are ways in which the human rights frame (although there is 
resistance to CEDAW100 and the human rights framework) can 
move beyond an individual psychological criminalizing 
perspective. That was a particularly important aspect of your 
comments, Sally. As you were speaking, I felt like we were 
reading each other’s minds. 
To address Sally and Renée’s comments about the cultural 
context, I have a colleague, Judi Greenberg, who teaches at New 
England School of Law and who is teaching a course this 
summer in Ireland on Comparative Domestic Violence Law in 
the United States, Ireland, India and South Africa. Not only are 
there law school casebooks now, one of which Clare Dalton and I 
just published,101 but there are courses on comparative domestic 
violence. Judi just left to teach this course in Ireland for two 
weeks, and we talked before she left. She observed that all four 
                                                          
99 Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women, Feminist Lawmaking, and 
International Human Rights, NEW ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
100 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (“CEDAW”), adopted in 1979 and otherwise known as the 
international bill of rights for women, is an international human rights treaty 
reaffirming and defining equal rights between men and women in all respects 
and specifically with respect to sex, political and public life, education, 
employment, health, marriage, and law. See United Nations General 
Assembly, The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (Dec. 18, 1979), available at gopher://gopher.un.org/ 
00/ga/cedaw/convention. 
101 CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN 
AND THE LAW (Foundation Press 2001). See also BEVERLY BALOS & MARY L. 
FELLOWS, LAW AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (Carolina Academic Press 
1994 & Supp. 2000); NANCY K.D. LEMON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW (West 
Publ’g Co. 2000). 
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countries rely on protective orders and criminalization remedies 
despite the diversity of contexts and explanations of domestic 
violence in each country. I do not know whether that just reflects 
the primacy of American frameworks in other countries or even 
whether it is true, but I think it is an interesting observation. 
Renée’s comments and Betsy’s responses regarding the 
greater social-welfare context, for example, of the Netherlands 
and the U.K., suggest the significance of cultural specificity.102 
Of course, there is always cultural specificity, and it is important 
to recognize this and integrate it into our analysis. Betsy did not 
mention this, but the history of the battered women’s movement 
in the U.K., for example, has historically been a more explicitly 





Very briefly, I think part of the answer to the question of 
differences in Western Europe is CEDAW (the Convention of the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women).104 
CEDAW is a treaty by the U.N. in 1979. Various countries use 
the international human rights perspective more and more as a 
framework to say what they are doing and whether they are 
complying with this document. The focus of CEDAW, however, 





As I discuss in the book, CEDAW and other international 
human rights documents see violence as linked to other aspects of 
women’s lives in ways that I think are very important. 
 
                                                          
102 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
103 See supra notes 71 (describing the battered women’s movement in the 
U.K.). 
104 See supra note 100. 
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Sally Merry 
 
Can I just intervene quickly? The thing about CEDAW is that 
it is not just about legislation; it is also about substantive 
equality. It is about media, ritual, and the spread of cultural 
stereotypes, education, and jobs. It actually has a very broad 
structural analysis about gender and equality. So I think it is 





CEDAW raises the question of the implications of 
international human rights. This is an area where there is a lot of 
activism and writing. Many people are doing activist work 
around the world and bringing knowledge and experience home 
regarding the difference an international human rights framework 
makes. 
On the mandatory arrest issue, I am sympathetic with the 
concerns that Renée raises.105 I think that it is not surprising that 
the Supreme Court struck down the civil rights remedy of 
VAWA,106 which was the non-criminal aspect. There are other 
sections of the Violence Against Women Act that still stand—
renewed money for shelters and other things that are being used 
in an affirmative way.107 There is no question in my mind that the 
                                                          
105 See supra text accompanying notes 52-68. 
106 See supra note 64 (discussing Violence Against Women Act). 
107 Congress views violence against women as a national problem and has 
resolved to continue to fund Violence Against Women Act programs, to which 
it appropriated close to $1,800,000,000 from 1995 to 2000. H.R. Con. Res. 
290, 106th Cong. (2000) (enacted). On October 28, 2000, President Clinton 
signed the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000), which strengthened and expanded VAWA 
programs and authorized funding. Press Release, White House (Oct. 28, 2000) 
(LEXIS, News Library, U.S. Newswire file); see also Jan Erickson, 
Legislative Update, NAT’L NOW TIMES (Winter 2001), at http://www. 
now.org/nnt/winter-2001/legupdate.html. Congress passed a bill appropriating 
over $400,000,000 to VAWA programs for the fiscal year ending September 
2001 and enacted Violence Against Women Act of 2000, which reauthorized 
SCHNEIDERMACRO 7-11FINALWINTRO.DOC 7/24/02  1:18 PM 
 BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 363 
                                                          
federal VAWA programs. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, Division B 
(2000); S. 2787, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. Res. 4690, 106th Cong. (2000). 
Nevertheless, fiscal year appropriations for the year 2001 fell $200,000,000 
short of authorized levels. Testimony Criminal Charges for Harm to a Fetus: 
Hearing Before the House Judiciary Comm., Constitution Subcomm., 106th 
Cong. (2001) (statement of Juley Fulcher, Public Policy Director, National 
Coalition Against Domestic Violence); Editorial, Fetus Bill a Devious Way to 
Attack Abortion Rights, ATL. J. & CONST., May 4, 2001, at 20A. The 
proposed 2002 budget increases VAWA funding by more than 35% from 
2001. Testimony of the Commerce, Justice, State & Judiciary Subcomm. of the 
House Appropriations Comm. Appropriations for the Justice Dep’t, 106th 
Cong. (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney General, United States). 
 Despite this substantial 2002 budget increase, it still falls over $100 
million short of congressional authorized funding levels for VAWA. Jan 
Erickson, Legislative Update: Bush and Congress Reach Out to Rich White 
Guys, NAT’L NOW TIMES, Summer 2001, available at http://www.now.org/ 
nnt/summer-2001/legupdate.html. This shortfall includes approximately half 
the authorized VAWA budget for rape prevention and education programs and 
less than authorized funding for battered women’s shelters. David M. Heger, 
Violence Against Women Policy Trends Report 19, NATIONAL VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN PREVENTION RESEARCH CENTER, July 5, 2001, at 
http://www.vawprevention.org/policy/trends/trends19.shtml. Additionally, the 
budget continues to provide no funding to a transitional housing program for 
victims despite a National Coalition Against Domestic Violence survey 
indicating that such a program is priority for domestic violence service 
providers. Id. However, the Bush Administration announced in April 2001 
that it would request from Congress the additional funding of $102.5 million 
authorized for VAWA. Erickson, supra. In April 2001, the Senate proposed 
that the month of April be designated as National Sexual Assault Awareness 
Month, encouraging efforts to eliminate sexual violence and provide justice to 
sexual assault victims. S. Res. 72, 107th Cong. (2001). The House introduced 
the Victim’s Economic Security and Safety Act in July 2001 providing 
workplace protections for domestic and sexual assault victims requiring time 
off for physical or emotional health care and legal assistance. H.R. 2670, 
107th Cong. (2001). The House, Senate, or President has not acted on either 
of these bills. More recently, the Bush Administration received criticism from 
women’s organizations alleging that his nominees for United States Attorney 
and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals are not capable of enforcing VAWA. 
See Audrey Hudson, 2nd Judicial Nominee Hit in Senate; Democrats Criticize 
Smith, GOP Cries Foul Over Pattern, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at 1 
(noting that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals nominee openly criticized 
VAWA on federalism grounds); Janet McConnaughey, NOW Says President’s 
Nominee “Inappropriate” for U.S. Attorney, BATON ROUGE STATE 
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privatization Mimi discussed is something that we will see only 
get worse. I would argue that the decontextualization of the 
broader gender framework in domestic violence that I discuss in 
the book is an example of this re-privatization, in a most 
problematic sense. 
It is also fascinating to me that some of you read this book as 
so optimistic. I see the book as much more textured, describing a 
glass half full but also half empty. Indeed, in the book I try to 
struggle with what I think are some of the real limitations of law, 
which I now see more clearly than when I began this work. For 
example, many of us who began this work thirty years ago 
thought that getting expert testimony in on battering was going to 
change the rules of the game. We may not have fully appreciated 
the tenacity of law to reverse those insights—the way that law is 
one step forward and three steps backward. That is very much 
my own view in the book. So it is very interesting to me that it is 
read more optimistically by several of you. Maybe that is just the 
difference between the mind of the author and the minds of 
readers. This is the very reason that it is wonderful and valuable 
to have this kind of conversation. 




I, too, take exception to the view that Liz’s book is simply 
“optimistic.” In fact, I think that her theoretical analysis puts to 
rest this naï vete about law. There may be a tendency among 
lawyers to look for a fix, and if the fix does not cure the 
problem, they are viewed as “pessimistic”; if the fix does, they 
are called “optimistic.” This pessimist/optimist analysis, I think, 
belies the theoretically informed dimensions of this book. If there 
is something that is optimistic for me in reading the book, it is 
Liz’s continual development of the social relations and human 
conditions, which place people in positions of struggling for 
emancipation. This comes through in her own voice as author, in 
her description of her own life as a younger person at the 
                                                          
TIMES/MORNING ADVOCATE, Feb. 2, 2002, at 6B. 
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beginning of her movement experience all the way to today. It is 
this spirit we so often put into our imagined world of feminist 
lawmaking that gives us an angle, or standpoint, for 
comprehending the dialectic of rights and politics from a feminist 
perspective. I take exception to the optimist/pessimist debate 
because I do not find it fruitful in understanding the praxis. 




I would like to ask Renée to amplify what she means by “the 
social category,”108 and by her critique that the social category 
offers a better alternative to legal strategies. Renée argues that 
European social democracies have adopted strategies of 
addressing feminist issues that are preferable to the legal 
strategies American feminists have adopted. I am not sure that I 
understand why there is an opposition or wherein it lies. 
There was a time in the early history of Second Wave 
Feminism in the United States when many of us thought that 
classical socialism contained sufficient understanding of the 
“Woman Question,” when we believed that social reform 
embracing equality for women would more or less automatically 
achieve feminist goals.109 This classical socialist view might be a 
version of “the social category.” As Friedrich Engels often told 
working class and socialist audiences about the socialist future: 
when the first free man meets the first free woman, transformed 
social relations between the sexes would begin to appear in the 
new world of freedom and equality.110 Our movement revealed 
that issues of power and ideology are much stickier and more 
                                                          
108 See supra notes 11, 24-28, 55, 67, 97-98 and accompanying text 
(referring to the shift in classifying battered women as a social category in the 
1970s to a legal category in the 1990s). 
109 For recent discussions of Second Wave Feminism, see generally DEAR 
SISTERS (Rosalyn Baxandall & Linda Gordon eds., Basic Books 2000); THE 
FEMINIST MEMOIR PROJECT (Rachel Blau DuPlessis & Ann Snitow eds., 
Three Rivers Press 1998). 
110 See FREDERICK ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE 
PROPERTY, AND THE STATE (Int’l Publishers Co. Aug. 1995). 
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recalcitrant than we had initially understood. Renée, do you 
disagree with this reading of the history of the women’s 
movement in the United States or draw other lessons from 
European experience? Do you see the solution to problems of 
domestic violence as lying solely in a decent public commitment 
of resources to people in trouble, and the treatment of abusers 
and abused within the family in accordance with a pathologizing, 
medical model? What is the social category? For me it is an 
interesting and provocative notion, but raises the uneasy feeling 




My intent when I made the dichotomy—and of course every 
dichotomy does not give a full spectrum of the facts—was to use 
a provocative hypothesis about the dichotomy between social and 
legal categories to highlight a tendency that I see in the U.S., in 
this case domestic violence—how a social problem becomes the 
subject of legalization that may exclude other political strategies. 
What are we doing as feminists, as people who are committed to 
social justice, when law seems to become a central strategy to 
achieve change? What kind of strategies do we look for? I 
certainly do not mean to use the social category to refer to 
battering as a medical or psychological issue, nor do I use it as a 
normative category in the sense that it implies or describes a 
certain approach or strategy that would necessarily be better or 
more effective. It is a descriptive distinction at this point to 
highlight what I consider to be a difference in the way law 
operates on a social and cultural level in the U.S. and in 
Europe,111 and the kinds of foci that are subsequently created in 
political strategies. 
 
                                                          
111 See supra notes 61-62, 71-73 and accompanying text (comparing the 
approach of the American battered women’s movement to that of similar 
activists in Western Europe, who have developed a method that provides a 
more equal balance between the legal and social strategies used in aiding 
battered women). 
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Isabel Marcus 
 
I want to raise the question of going beyond caselaw and 
legislation. Most countries have some form of legislation that 
deals with the question of defining injury and the appropriate 
court’s jurisdiction, and I don’t think that the existence of a 
statute is the issue. Rather the focus should be on how law, 
lawyers and people hold public officials accountable. In one 
sense law has very limited ways to achieve accountability. In the 
United States, there are class action lawsuits and endless 
litigation, but law is a rough though necessary framework for 
accountability. Within bureaucracies, accountability is a much 
more complicated issue; the sledgehammer of the law does not 
achieve accountability. For example, in Eastern Europe there is 
no notion of suing the police for violations of civil rights, 
including for failure to protect battered women if prosecutorial 
discretion is abused.112 If judges pressure parties to settle cases by 
asking whether a battered woman forgives the perpetrator, or if 
doctors will not give a medical certificate, a gate-keeping device 
to allow the woman to file a lawsuit or a complaint with the 
police, separate criminal code provisions will be mere law on the 
books. It seems to me that as one starts thinking about 
accountability, the grass roots activism occurring in many 
countries is not about rewriting the law. Rather, it is a search for 





That calls for greater public transparency and is more 
                                                          
112 See Christian Boulanger, Constitutionalism in East Central Europe? 
The Case of Slovakia Under Merciar, 33 EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY 21 
(Mar. 1999); Virginie Guiraudon, Third Country Nationals and European 
Law: Obstacles to Rights’ Expansion, 24 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUDIES 
657 (Oct. 1998); Meltem Muftuler-Bac, The Impact of the European Union on 
Turkish Politics, 34 EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY 159 (June 2000) (explaining 
that the law on prosecuting public officials is a major obstacle to the trial and 
punishment of public officials for human rights violations). 
SCHNEIDERMACRO 7-11FINALWINTRO.DOC 7/24/02  1:18 PM 
368 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
complex than the simple question of how privacy is situated as a 
value for Justice Scalia. New legal mechanisms or accountability 
for violent behaviors can be enacted. Liz’s involvement in 
writing an amicus brief in support of Hedda Nussbaum, who sued 
Joel Steinberg for tort damages,113 provides one example of this. 
Liz argued against civil assault statutes of limitation laws to 
enable battered women to exercise a legal right to sue in a civil 
context.114 I also think Isabel’s points are quite good in terms of 
showing the life of law and the continuing, unfolding dimensions 
of law. This perspective gives a richer analysis of state power 




You emphasize, Chris, the need for recognition of the 
importance of options other than law. And I find very interesting, 
for example, what has been happening in Australia, where 
activists are looking for alternative remedies that are more about 
developing social structures to hold agencies accountable.115 
 
Audience Member 
                                                          
113 Nussbaum v. Steinberg, 703 A.D.2d 32 (N.Y. 2000). 
114 See SCHNEIDER supra, note 1, at 94, 181-82. 
115 In Australia, a report entitled Key Directions in Women’s Safety—A 
Co-ordinated Approach to Reducing Violence Against Women was released on 
February 8, 2002 by the Office of Women’s Policy recognized the need for a 
specific strategy to address violence against women. See Family Violence: 
Victorian Update, at http://www.dvirc.org.au/resources/DVUpdateVictoria. 
htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2002). It proposed to focus government efforts in 
four key areas to reduce violence against women: (1) protection and justice 
(focusing on reform of the criminal justice system and police response), (2) 
options for women (including strategies to allow women to remain in the home 
rather than fleeing), (3) prevention of violence (including early intervention 
programs targeting young men), (4) community action and coordination 
(including a move toward an integrated response for family violence based on 
the “Duluth Model,” which incorporates the criminal justice system, programs 
for victims, perpetrators and other services. See Domestic Abuse Intervention 
Project, at http//www.Duluth-model.org/daipmain.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 
2002). 
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I am from Turkey. One thing that you brought up is human 
rights texts and other texts like CEDAW. I do not think it is right 
to imply a lack of creativity on the part of people in other 
countries—for not enough people care about human rights. Even 
if people do care, many issues exist that have to be addressed. In 
discussing the private/public issue you first address privacy from 
a social aspect. And then you address privacy in terms of 
economics, for example the privatization of social securities. I 
guess there is a benefit in this. 
In Turkey, we have virginity exams.116 In the first sense of 
privacy, we cannot get rid of them. Constitutionally we are 
entitled to some level of privacy, but is privacy good for us? We 
cannot just turn it into gender equality. So the argument against 
privatization falls under one of economics. We are for privacy, 
however, because we do not want vaginal exams. In that sense, 
there is a certain use for privacy. I am not willing to give it up. It 




I agree. One thing I want to clarify, because it is important 
that it not be misunderstood, is that in the book, I also discuss 
some of the ways in which it is important to think affirmatively 
                                                          
116 In Turkey, as in other societies, women are expected to be virgins 
until marriage, and those accused of not being virgins must consent to 
virginity exams under tremendous family and police pressures. REGAN RALPH, 
A MATTER OF POWER: STATE CONTROL OF WOMEN’S VIRGINITY IN TURKEY 6 
(Human Rights Watch 1994). If rumors suggest a young woman is not a 
virgin, her family will often bring her to a state or private physician to 
establish either that her hymen is intact, or, if not, that it was damaged in an 
accident and not broken through sexual activity. Id. 
 In 1999, the government banned virginity testing of female students, but 
in 2001, Turkey’s conservative health minister introduced regulations 
permitting principals in state schools that train nurses, midwives, and other 
health workers to expel girls who are not virgins. Susan Fraser, Virginity Tests 
Spark Outrage: Turkish Teens in Nurse School Must Submit, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE, July 19, 2001, at 5C. Once again, however, the practice has been 
halted. Turkey Rescinds Law on Virginity, RECORD, Feb. 28, 2002, at A8.  
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about privacy.117 Privacy is not just this terrible thing for battered 
women; it is important that privacy can also offer safety, 
integrity, and autonomy for women generally, as well as women 
who are battered. Many legal issues and many political questions 
have merged around these issues of privacy. Some examples 
include confidentiality of battered women’s names and addresses, 
privacy regarding the forwarding of mail, confidentiality and 
privacy regarding shelters and conversations with battered 
woman counselors. Thus, there are many contexts in which 
privacy for battered women is important and should be 
understood in that affirmative way. 
None of this is simple. Sally’s first point—that the definition 
of the problem is so central—is the reason I start with the 
definition of the problem in the book. Other points that have not 
been mentioned in the conversation are the incredible difficulties 
in integrating and absorbing the lessons of the feminist arguments 
around domestic violence over a long period of time, the 
tremendous struggles judges face to do the job that they need to 
do, and the immense challenge to train lawyers to listen to the 
problems of battered women and not immediately move into a 
pathological perspective. I have been teaching specialized courses 
on domestic violence in law schools for ten years and have been 
training lawyers for many years on issues of domestic violence. 
Even lawyers who are incredibly thoughtful and sophisticated and 
who have done really good work have to engage in a continual 
process of self-reflection and self-criticism. This book is written 
in that spirit. I do not say this is the end of the conversation about 
our accomplishments and mistakes, but that a process of ongoing 
self-criticism and reflection is part of what it means to do this 
work. One constantly has to examine the new forms and 
manifestations of subversion, whether it is privatization or the 
ways in which—and I am sure Sally would agree—even the 
international human rights framework can be turned into its own 
contradiction. It is really about this as a long haul struggle, a 
long-term process of having to think and evaluate and rethink. 
Having said that, I do want to go back to the issue that Renée 
                                                          
117 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 89-90. 
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raised about feminist lawmaking. The term “feminist lawmaking” 
is intended to be descriptive, not normative. Feminist legal 
advocates have helped develop new legal harms where they did 
not exist before. The law would not recognize sexual 
harassment118 or domestic violence as a harm if not for feminist 
lawmaking. Has that meant victory or even linear progress? Not 
at all! It has meant new struggles, new problems, new directions, 
and new twists in the road. But to not recognize that there has 
been something that has changed is, I think, not to really 
acknowledge the power and importance of feminist legal work 
over the last thirty years. We have not done enough, but we have 
made some incredibly important inroads. Law is not enough, but 





What are those lessons you mention? And what about looking 
toward the future and seeing what coordination is being done 




Well, I think it is a worldwide movement now. There is an 
extraordinary amount of important work being done everywhere 
on these issues.119 The lessons involve recognizing the impact of 
                                                          
118 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986). 
119 See supra notes 21-22, 26-30, 40-42, 51, 61-62, 70-73 (discussing the 
international battered women’s movements). See also supra note 100 and 
accompanying text (discussing the United Nations’ Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”)). See generally 
Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and 
Future Developments in International Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 607 (1997) 
(chronicling the evolution of the international movement to combat violence 
against women); Stacy R. Sandusky, Women’s Political Participation in 
Developing and Democratizing Countries: Focus on Zimbabwe, 5 BUFF. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 253, 270-80 (discussing women’s movements in Uganda, 
Tanzania, Kenya, Namibia and South Africa). 
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feminist legal advocacy around the world in transforming our 
understandings, and yet recognizing that that work has to be done 
in a self-critical way, that it has to be subject to, in a sense, the 
dialectics of practice, of seeing what works, of going back to 
theory, and going back to practice. Finally, the lessons show that 










It certainly focuses largely on that American experience, but 
it does not suggest that the American experience can or should be 
imported to other countries or cultures. I have done some work 
on violence in other parts of the world like South Africa and 
China. I think it is important to link this process in the U.S. with 
others around the world and to see the resonances and differences 
in other places. It would be wonderful if similar reflection and 
evaluation were done in other parts of the world and in other 
culturally-specific contexts to consider the victories, obstacles 
and lessons that we have to learn to do better work for women 




Thank you all, both panelists and audience members, so much 
for your participation in this stimulating conversation. 
 
                                                          
120 See supra notes 28 (discussing the legal rights and legislative approach 
to domestic violence that is used in the United States), 64 (discussing how 
VAWA functions) and accompanying text. 
